The Endangered Species Act Applies Extraterritorially. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990) by Epstein, Bradley J.
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 19
1-1-1992
The Endangered Species Act Applies
Extraterritorially. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990)
Bradley J. Epstein
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley J. Epstein, The Endangered Species Act Applies Extraterritorially. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), 5
Transnat'l Law. 447 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol5/iss1/19
The Endangered Species Act Applies
Extraterritorially. Defenders of Wildlife
v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
(U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments
Reprinted in Appendix A.)
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ............................. 448
If. LEGAL BACKGROUND .......................... 450
A. The History of the Endangered Species Act ...... 450
B. Section 7, Interagency Cooperation ............ 452
1. The Consultation Process ................ 452
2. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill:
Interpretation of Section 7 ............... 454
C. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 456
D. United States v. Mitchell: The Presumption
Against Extraterritorial Application of Laws ..... 459
E. Department of Interior Regulations ............ 462
I. THE CASE ............................... 463
A. The Facts ............................. 463
B. Procedural Aspects ....................... 464
C. The Opinion ........................... 464
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS .......................... 469
A. The Application of the Doctrine of Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations ........... 469
B. The Application of the Doctrine of the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality ......... 473
V. CONCLUSION .............................. 478
APPENDIX A
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ....... 480
447
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit boldly decided in Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan'
[hereinafter Defenders] that the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA)' applies extraterritorially.3 In an apparent departure from
the strict textualist approach followed by the United States
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit overturned the Secretary of the
Interior's 1986 regulations, which provided that the ESA did not
apply abroad.' However, in May 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted a petition for writ of certiorari submitted by the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Manual Lujan, Jr.
[hereinafter Secretary], agreeing to review the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of the ESA.5 The Supreme Court will probably
reverse Defenders.
In Defenders, the Eighth Circuit's analysis contrasted with the
most recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the doctrines of
judicial deference to agency interpretations and the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.7 Defenders is
also significant because of the vast impact it could have on
construction projects, environmental groups, and wildlife
throughout the world.
If the ESA is applied extraterritorially, private companies might
be barred from working on certain projects located in foreign
1. 911 F.2d 117(8thCir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S.C.2008 (1991).The other main issue,
plaintiffs' standing to sue, is beyond the scope of this note.
2. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988)).
3. Extraterritoriality refers to an act by which a state (nation) extends its jurisdiction beyond
its own boundaries into the territory of another state, and exercises its jurisdiction over its nationals.
15A CJ.S. Conflict of Laws § 6 (1967).
4. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1986).
5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
6. See infra part TV (arguing that the Supreme Court will probably reverse Defenders); see
also J. Clark Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term and Preview of the 1991-92 Term
for the Transnational Practitioner, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 391, 411-15 (1991) (predicting the Court
will hold that the ESA does not apply extraterritorially); see generally icL pt. IV.A (previewing the
Supreme Court's anticipated decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife).
7. See infra part IV (comparing the court's analysis in Defenders with that of other cases).
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nations.' On the other end of the spectrum, such extraterritorial
application is consistent with many conservation organizations'
raisons d'etre9
The ESA's inapplicability abroad has created frustrations
among U.S. citizens. For example, Travis County and the city of
Austin, in Texas, have had problems with their animal conservation
efforts.' 0 The two government entities attempted to develop a
habitat conservation plan for the golden-cheeked warbler, an
endangered bird that migrates from Texas to Guatemala for the
winter season." These local government efforts were thwarted
because the U.S. Department of Agriculture sprays pesticides in
Guatemala, harming the birds in spite of efforts to develop the
warbler population." Since, under the federal government's
position, the ESA does not apply in foreign nations, the
Department of Agriculture need not consult with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service--as it would in a domestic project-to find less
8. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (AI.D.) has spent,
and proposes to spend, billions of dollars on projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brief for
Defenders of Wildlife at Addendum-13, Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-5192MN), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). These current and proposed projects include
hydro-electric development, reforestation, family planning and health, and urban small enterprise
development. Id. If the ESA has extraterritorial application and one of these proposed projects would
adversely affect endangered species, then the U.S. would possibly not be able to participate in the
project. Absent U.S. participation and expertise, the project probably could not be accomplished, or
at the least, the result would be inadequate funds available for the private contractors associated with
the project.
9. The goals of the Defenders of Wildlife and the Humane Society of the United States are
consistent with the ESA's extraterritorial application. The purpose of the Defenders of Wildlife is "to
preserve, enhance and protect the natural abundance and diversity of wildlife including the integrity
of natural wildlife ecosystems." Brief for the Respondents at 19, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11
S. Ct. 2008 (1991) (No. 90-1424). "The Humane Society of the United States ('HSUS') has been
actively involved in international protection and management of wildlife for more than ten years.
HSUS has funded both a study to determine problems occurring as a result of development of the
tropical rain forests and an investigation into the conservation and humane treatment of wild birds
in foreign countries. HSUS also conducts wildlife viewing tours to Africa for the benefit of HSUS
members." Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
10. States, Cities Side With Environmental Group in Supreme Court Battle Over Endangered
Species Abroad, U.S. Newswire, Aug. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, USNWR File
[hereinafter Environmental Group].
11. Id
12. Id.
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damaging alternatives to the spraying, or even to assess the impact
of spraying on the warbler habitat.13
Defenders has also generated great interest worldwide, because
of concern that national boundaries do little to limit environmental
effects. 4 Thus, at least eleven U.S. states, numerous cities,
environmental groups from foreign nations on three continents, and
members of the scientific community filed amicus curiae briefs
with the Supreme Court.
15
This note discusses the Eighth Circuit Court's decision to apply
the ESA extraterritorially. Part I recounts the ESA's legal
background and the doctrines the court applied regarding deference
to agency interpretations and extraterritoriality. Part IHI sets out the
Defenders case. Part IV analyzes the court's lack of deference to
the Secretary's interpretation, to only apply the ESA domestically,
and the court's application of the presumption against the ESA's
extraterritoriality. Also, Part IV predicts that the Supreme Court
will reverse Defenders.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Endangered Species Act
Sparked by a popular clamor to conserve natural resources, the
preservation of wildlife species became a valid and important
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory: "When In Rome" Multinational Misconduct
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L RErV. 598, 640-41 nn.277-79 (1990).
Because of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the citizens of European countries, including Sweden,
Finland, and Poland will likely experience increases in various forms of cancer for decades to come.
lIa at 641. In Poland, 50% of milk and dairy products were irradiated. Id. at 641 n.280. Hundreds
of thousands of reindeer and livestock had to be destroyed in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Id. A
study by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory claimed that Chemobyl emitted 50% more long-term
radiation into the world's air, topsoil, and water than all the nuclear weapons ever exploded. Ii. at
641 n.279.
15. Environmental Group, supra note 10. States filing briefs were Arkansas, California,
Florida, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Vermont. Also, the
American Institute of Biological Sciences and the American Association of Zoological Parks and
Aquariums filed briefs. Endangered Species: States File in High Court Case, Greenwire, Sept. 3,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gmwre File.
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national goal in the early 1960s.16 The first legislation in which
Congress focused on species extinction was the Endangered Species
Act of 1966.7 This act obligated the Department of the Interior
to establish an endangered species program.18 However, no
program was ever developed because the Act's only substantive
provision was to authorize the acquisition of lands to protect
endangered species. 9 In addition, the Act's policy applied only to
the extent practicable; that is, the policy was too narrow to become
a force in species protection."
In 1969, Congress enacted the Endangered Species
Conservation Act.21  This act extended protection to, and
prohibited the importation of, foreign species of wildlife determined
to be threatened with worldwide extinction.22 However, the 1969
Act was also inadequate, since it did not apply to actions by federal
agencies.23 In addition, the Act did not include provisions for the
protection of threatened species.24
Then, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973;
section 7 is entitled "Interagency cooperation."' While Congress
16. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER El" AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SocIETY 658-59 (1992).
17. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (§§ 1-3 repealed 1973).
18. § 2(d), 80 Stat. at 927. Endangered species are those that are "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of [their] range other than a species of Class Insecta determined
by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of the [Endangered
Species Act] would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to [humans].- 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
19. See § 2(a), 80 Stat. at 926; see also John C. Beiers, Comment, The International
Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171, 177
(1989) (describing the history of the ESA).
20. § l(b), 80 Stat. at 926. See Beiers, supra note 19, at 177 (discussing reasons the 1966 Act
was not effective in protecting endangered species); see also Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption
Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 825, 835 (1991) (discussing the 1966 Act's practicability requirement).
21. Pub. L No. 91-135, §§ 1-5, 83 Stat. 275, 275-78 (1969) (repealed 1973).
22. §§ 2-3(a), 83 Stat, at 275-76.
23. Beiers, supra note 19, at 178.
24. Ia Threatened species are those that "are likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of their range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
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has amended the ESA numerous times since 1973,26 the section
7 requirements have remained intact."
B. Section 7, Interagency Cooperation
1. The Consultation Process
Section 7 of the ESA creates substantive and procedural duties
for all federal agencies which undertake actions affecting
endangered or threatened species.28  Federal agencies, 29  in
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), must take positive
actions to carry out programs to conserve wildlife species.3" Also,
federal agencies must avoid taking actions which may jeopardize
threatened or endangered species or their critical habitats. 31 Such
actions include any programs authorized, funded, or carried out by
federal agencies.32
Under section 7, when a federal agency discovers that it may
perform an action that will adversely affect a threatened or
endangered species, it must undertake an extensive consultation
26. Pub. L. No. 100-707,102 Stat. 4709 (1988); Pub. L No. 99-659, 100 Stat. 3742-1 (1986);
Pub. L No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1417, 1426 (1982); Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1226 (1979); Pub. L.
No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3752 (1978).
27. 911 F.2d at 124; Beiers, supra note 19, at 179.
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
29. A federal agency is any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States. §
1532(7).
30. "'Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for
the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 4 of this
Act.' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). See Beiers, supra note 19, at 178 (All federal agencies are required
to consult with the FWS in order to further the purposes of the ESA). See also Rosiers, supra note
20, at 825-26 (The ESA requires that all government departments and agencies protect endangered
and threatened species).
31. § 1536(a)(2) (1991). Critical habitats are "() the specific areas within the geographical
area occupied by the species," at the time it is listed as threatened or endangered, "on which are
found physical or biological features (1) essential to the conservation of the species and (I1) which
may require special management considerations or protections; and (ii) [the] specific areas outside
the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed .... upon a determination by
the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species." § 1532(5)(A).
32. § 1536(a)(2).
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process.33 Initially, the agency must obtain from the FWS or the
NMFS any information regarding whether a listed species 3' may
be present in the project area." If there are listed species, and the
project is a major construction activity,36 the agency must prepare
a biological assessment within 180 days.38  When the
assessment reveals a likely adverse effect on listed species, the
agency must formally consult with FWS or NMFS,39 resulting in
a formal biological opinion4 by either one of these agencies
within ninety days.41  During the ninety-day period, the
constructing agency must refrain from making an irreversible
commitment of resources that would foreclose reasonable project
alternatives.42 In the event that either FWS or NMFS finds that
the project is likely to jeopardize the existence of a listed species,
it must identify what reasonable and prudent alternatives, if any,
the agency can take to avoid violating section 7.43 The agency
must then decide whether and in what manner to proceed with the
action, taking into consideration its section 7 obligations and the
biological opinion.' The agency may disagree with the biological
33. § 1536(a)(1), (2).
34. A species, to be given protection under the ESA, must be either listed as threatened or
endangered. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
35. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (1986).
36. A major construction activity is a construction project, or other undertaking having similar
physical impacts, which is a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment as referred to in the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
50 C.F.I. § 402.02.
37. The biological assessment is the information prepared by or under the direction of the
federal agency concerning listed and proposed species and designated and proposed critical habitat
that may be present in the action area and the evaluation of the action's potential effects on such
species and habitat. Id.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12.
39. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (Either the FWS or NMFS must assist the federal agency
to determine if there is a possible section 7 violation).
40. "'Biological opinion' is the document that states the opinion of the [FWS or he NMFS]
as to whether or not the Federal action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
41. § 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.12(k), .14(b), (e).
42. § 1536(d); 50 C.F.R. § 402.09.
43. § 1536(b)(3)(A), (4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(5), (h).
44. 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a).
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opinion, adopt an alternative course to avoid jeopardy to the
species, or seek an exemption from ESA requirements.45
2. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill:46 Interpretation of
Section 7
Because consultation under section 7 is required, its
interpretation is critical. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed the ESA's extraterritorial application, its landmark
decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill [hereinafter TVA],
interpreting section 7, arguably implied that the ESA applies
abroad. The Supreme Court in TVA construed section 7 broadly,
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)-(h); 50 C.F.R. pts. 450-53. Federal projects may be exempted from
ESA requirements if the following conditions are met: (1) No reasonable and prudent alternatives to
the agency action exist; (2) the action is in the public interest and its benefits clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat;
(3) the action is of regional or national significance; and (4) reasonable measures are taken to
minimize the adverse effects of the action on the endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A). The
exemption application is reviewed by the Endangered Species Committee (commonly called the
'God Squad"), composed of seven members: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the
Army, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one individual from each affected state appointed by
the President. § 1536(e)(3). See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An
Environmental LawParadigm andIts Consequences, 19 U. MIcH. J.L REP. 805,812-13 n.29 (1986);
Symposium, Environmental Law: More than Just a Passing Fad, 19 U. MIcH. J.L REP. 797 (1986).
The exemption process is rigorous. Plater, supra, at 828 (It is "'a tough, high level review process.").
There has been only one successful exemption-the Greyrocks Dam project, which affected the
whooping crane species-in the two times exemptions have been considered by the Endangered
Species Committee since the exemption process has been in force. James C. Kilbourne, The
Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21
Envtl L 499, 563 (1991). The first project considered was the Tellico Dam project, which affected
the snail darter species of fish. Plater, supra, at 812-13 n.29. To date, the exemption proceedings
regarding the Bureau of Land Management Oregon timber sales, which affects the northern spotted
owl species, have not been completed. Notice of Threshold Determination and Opportunity to Review
Administrative Record, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,562 (Endangered Species Comm. 1991). See Rosiers, supra
note 20, at 854-55 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining an exemption under the ESA).
46. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), superseded by statute as stated in Bd. of Governors v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 153 (1986).
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holding that it contained no exceptions.4 7 Subsequent courts have
followed this expansive reading of the ESA.48
In TVA, citizen groups successfully challenged the construction
of the 80%-completed Tellico Dam.49 Tennessee Valley Authority,
a wholly owned, public corporation of the U.S. government, wished
to complete the construction of the Tennessee dam.5" The
plaintiffs claimed that the dam would adversely affect the snail
darter, an endangered fish species.5 After trial, the court held that
section 7 was inapplicable because the dam construction was
almost completed.52 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
this ruling, and issued a permanent injunction holding that section
7 did not contain an exemption for ongoing projects.53
Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit,
stating that the ESA's policies and every one of its sections reflect
Congress plain intent to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction.54 Also, the Court found that section 7's language gives
no exceptions to its scope, as Congress was concerned with the
unknown uses and importance of endangered species to life on
Earth.55
To support its decision, the Court reasoned that the ESA's
plain language shows that it applies to federal projects which were
underway when Congress passed the ESA.56 The Court then
explained that the ESA's language, history, and structure indicates
beyond doubt that Congress intends endangered species to be
47. Id at 173. "One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms are any
plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.... This language admits of no exception."
Id
48. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979) (The ESA
applies to all of the Secretary's actions); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (TVA made clear that the ESA "'is a potent environmental control"); Village of False Pass v.
Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984) (The ESA applies to all federal actions).
49. 437 U.S. at 195.
50. Id at 157.
51. Id
52. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
53. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
54. TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
55. Id
56. Id at 173.
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afforded the highest of priorities.57 The Court did not find specific
language or legislative intent to show that the ESA applies to
almost completed projects such as the dam. Thus, the Supreme
Court looked to the general congressional intent that the ESA's
primary goal is to halt species extinction at whatever the cost.
58
C. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council:
59
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations
In interpreting statutes, courts look to administering agencies
for guidance. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council [hereinafter Chevron], the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated
the principles for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
The Court in Chevron reviewed EPA regulations promulgated in
1981 which were designed to implement the Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments of 1977.' The regulations allowed states to establish
a permit requirement which adopted a plant-wide definition of the
term "stationary source."'" This definition allowed states to treat
all pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial plant as
though they were encased in a single bubble.62 Under that
definition, an existing plant that contained several pollution-
emitting devices could install or modify one piece of equipment
without meeting permit conditions, if the alteration would not
increase the total pollution emissions from the plant.63 The
57. Id. at 184-85.
58. Id. at 184. The Tellico Dam was eventually built when Congress exempted the project
from all laws. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, Pub. L No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 433
(1980). In addition, Congress amended the ESA, establishing an exemption process to avoid such
problems in the future. Pub. L No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978); see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)-(h).
59. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
60. Id. at 839-40.
61. Id. at 840. Congress enacted certain requirements applicable to states that had not achieved
the national air quality standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 839-40
(citing Pub. L No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). These amendments required such states to establish
a permit program regulating "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution. I&. at 840.
Prior to the amendments, "stationary source" was def'med as any "building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under [the Clean Air
Act]." IM. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1977)).
62. 467 U.S. at 840.
63. Id.
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plaintiffs claimed that these regulations violated the law, and
requested that the Court set them aside.'
Refusing to invalidate the regulations, the Court announced its
two-prong test for reviewing an agency's statutory construction.'
First, has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at
issue?66 If congressional intent is clear, the court simply
effectuates that intent; both the courts and agencies must give
effect to Congress unambiguously expressed intent. 7 Second, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
is the agency's interpretation a permissible 8 construction of the
statute?69 The Court recognized that the judiciary should accord
considerable weight to an agency's interpretation." It explained
that deference is proper when reviewing an agency's interpretation
of a statute that involves reconciling conflicting policies.7 Also,
a court should defer to the agency's interpretation when the issue
depends upon the agency's expertise. 2 The Supreme Court
explained that if the agency's interpretation is a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies committed to the agency's
care by the statute, then the interpretation should not be disturbed,
unless it appears from the statutory language or history that the
interpretation is one that Congress would not have sanctioned."
64. Id at 841.
65. Id. at 842.
66. Id.
67. Id at 842-43. The Court noted that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.- Id. at 843 n.9.
68. The Court probably meant that reviewing courts should not support agency interpretations
unless the courts believed them to be reasonable. Jerry L Mashaw, Textuallsm, Constituonalisr,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 830 (1991).
69. 467 U.S. at 843.
70. Id at 844.
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id, at 845.
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Applying the first prong of its test,74 the Supreme Court
initially noted that the amendments at issue were lengthy, detailed,
technical, complex, and comprehensive."5 It then recognized that
the amendments' legislative history did not mention either the
bubble concept or whether a plant-wide definition of a stationary
source is permissible under the permit program.76 The Court's
opinion noted that the legislative history disclosed Congress wish
to accommodate the conflicting policies between the economic
interest in permitting capital improvements to continue and the
environmental interest in improving air quality.77
Next, the Supreme Court examined the statutory language of
the CAA.71 Thie Court found that the only congressional intent
discerned from the language was to enlarge the scope of the
agency's power to regulate in order to effectuate the Act's
policies.79 It also looked to the CAA's legislative history,
concluding that it was silent regarding the definition of a stationary
source.
80
Finding that the congressional intent was unclear, the Court
applied the test's second prong: whether the agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of the statute. Rejecting the argument
that the agency's statutory interpretation was not entitled to
deference, because it differed from prior interpretations, the Court
found that the CAA gave the agency broad discretion in
implementing the policies of the 1977 amendments.81 Looking to
congressional intent behind the Act, the Court found that the
challenged regulation was consistent with policy concerns of
74. Id at 845-62. The Court's reasoning in Chevron has been subject to sharp criticism. Most
of the criticisms include the arguments that Chevron ignores the need for an independent judicial
arbiter on legal questions, is inconsistent with Congress instructions, and is too general and
undifferentiated to approach the wide range of questions that arise under the Chevron rubric. Cass
R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L REv. 2071, 2075 (1990).
75. 467 U.S. at 848.
76. Id. at 851.
77. Id
78. Id. at 859-62.
79. Id. at 861-62.
80. 467 U.S. at 862 ("[Tihe legislative history as a whole is silent on the precise issue"
regarding the definition of a new source).
81. Id at 862.
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allowing reasonable economic growth and serving environmental
objectives.82 The Court argued that an agency promulgating
regulations must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom
of its policy on a continuing basis.83 Additionally, the Court
reasoned that the agency had adopted different definitions in
different contexts, which shows that the definition is flexible.8" It
supported this reasoning by noting that Congress had never
indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute.85
The Supreme Court concluded that the agency's interpretation
was a reasonable accommodation of competing interests and was
entitled to deference.86 It held that a challenge to an agency
interpretation must fail if it focuses on the wisdom of the agency's
policy rather than on whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap
left open by Congress.
87
D. United States v. Mitchell:88  The Presumption Against
Extraterritorial Application of Laws
When deciding whether statutes apply abroad, courts usually
apply a presumption against extraterritoriality. In United States v.
Mitchell, the Fifth Circuit applied the traditional test regarding the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.89
The court addressed the application of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA)9 to an American citizen taking
dolphins within the territorial waters of a foreign sovereign state.9
82. Id at 863.
83. Id at 863-64.
84. Id. at 864.
85. 467 U.S. at 864.
86. Id. at 865.
87. I& at 866.
88. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
89. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949), the U.S. Supreme Court first stated the
presumption against extraterritoriality: statutes apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
if there is no evidence of contrary congressional intent. Id at 285.
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). See generally MfichaelT. Parsons, Comment, The Marine
Mammal Protection Act: Working Towardan Effective InternationalSolution to the Dolphin Problem,
4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 673 (1991).
91. 553 F.2d at 997.
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Jerry Mitchell, an American citizen, was convicted of violating the
MMPA by capturing twenty-one dolphins within the three-mile
limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.92 The MMPA had
established a permanent moratorium on the taking of marine
mammals.93
To determine whether the MMPA applied abroad, the court in
Mitchell adopted a test requiring two inquiries.94 First, the court
examines the nature of the law, determining whether limiting its
applicability domestically would curtail its scope and usefulness,
leaving open a large immunity for frauds committed by citizens on
the high seas or in foreign nations.' Second, if the nature of the
law does not mandate its extraterritorial application, a presumption
arises against such application.96 To overcome this presumption,
a clear expression of congressional intent must be shown.97
Applying the first prong of its test, Mitchell held that the nature
of the MMPA did not compel its application in foreign
territories.9" The court recognized that the MMPA was a
conservation statute, and reasoned that each sovereign may regulate
the exploitation of natural resources within its territory.99 The
court stated that when Congress enacts environmental legislation,
it recognizes that conservation in other nations is left to diplomatic
negotiations, treaties, and conventions."° Mitchell concluded its
first prong analysis by stating that restricting the territoriality of the
Act would not greatly curtail its scope and usefulness."0 ' Thus,
the Fifth Circuit held that it could not infer from the nature of the
92. IdX
93. Xa at 1000. The court defined the term "permanent moratorium" as a "complete cessation
of the taking of marine mammals and a complete ban on the importation into the United States of
marine mammals and marine mammal products .... "" d (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
94. Id at 1002. See infra notes 95,97 (citing the origin of the two prongs of the court's test).
95. 553 F.2d at 1002 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)).
96. Iad (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285
(1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
97. Id (citing Steele, 344 U.S. at 285; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
98. Id
99. Ic (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FORmON RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STAIE
§ 45 reporters' note 1 (1965)).
100. Id. at 1002-03.
101. 553 F.2d at 1003.
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MMPA congressional intent that the Act applied to the territories
of foreign sovereigns." *
Applying the second prong of its test, Mitchell found that the
MMPA did not rebut the presumption against extraterritorial
application."°3 Listing five reasons, the court held that neither the
statute's language nor its legislative history provided a clear
expression of congressional intent to apply the MMPA abroad." 4
The court rejected the argument that the statute's all-inclusive
language demonstrated its applicability abroad."l 5 It reasoned that
since the Act's language did not expressly address territoriality, it
did not indicate a clear intent for extraterritorial application."0
The court noted that when Congress defined the geographic scope
in one section of the MMPA, it did not make conduct in foreign
territory unlawful. 7 Thus, Mitchell inferred that Congress
intended that the Act's prohibitions only applied domestically." 8
Next, the court recognized that under the MMPA, the Secretary
of Commerce must promulgate regulations using the best scientific
evidence available and in consultation with the Marine Mammal
Commission."t9 It reasoned that the methods by which scientific
evidence would be gathered in other sovereign nations were
unclear.1 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress intended
that the Act only apply in the U.S. and on the high seas, where
such data may be collected without restrictions from other
jurisdictions.1
102. Id
103. /, at 1003-04.
104. Id
105. Id
106. 553 F.2d at 1003-04. The court analogized to Foley Bro=, where the statute in question
used all-inclusive language. 1d The court noted that in Foley Bros, the Supreme Court concluded
that the statute's words and its legislative history did not evidence intent specifically for
extraterritorial application. Id
107. Id at 1004.
108. Id
109. 1d ("No mammal may be taken without a permit under [16 U.S.C.] sections 1371 and
1372. Any permit issued must be consistent with regulations established under [16 U.S.C.] section
1373.").
110. AL
111. 553 F.2d at 1004.
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Furthermore, the court found that the MMPA's legislative
history expressly discussed one conservation problem in the
territorial waters of another sovereign: the annual hunt of baby harp
seals off the Canadian coast and the accompanying public
indignation.112 On this point, the court held that the history
indicated no intent to apply the Act extraterritorially.113
Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted that there was no congressional
discussion of extraterritorial application of the MMPA's
amendment, concerning a five-year moratorium on the taking of
marine mammals.'14 It concluded that if Congress meant to
extend the moratorium extraterritorially, the amendment sponsors
would have recognized a duty to explain, on the floors of Congress
and in the committee reports, the need for such an extension. 115
Thus, the court reversed Mitchell's conviction and held that the
MMPA did not apply extraterritorially." 6
E. Department of Interior Regulations
As part of the ESA, Congress requires the Secretary to define
the Department of the Interior responsibilities in carrying out the
section 7 consultation program through regulations. 117 In 1977,
the Secretary proposed that section 7 had extraterritorial
application."' The following year, the final regulations stated that
section 7 required every federal agency to insure that its activities
and programs in the U.S., upon the high seas, and in foreign
countries, will not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species. 119
112. ML (citing H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4149).
113. Id
114. Id
115. Id
116. I, at 1004-5.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4). Congress granted a large degree of dLscretion to the Secretary.
§ 1536(a)(1).
118. 50 C.F.R. § 17.91.
119. 50 C.F.R. § 402.
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In 1986, the Secretary changed his position about the ESA's
extraterritoriality. Initially, the Secretary had issued a notice of
proposed regulations, limiting section 7's scope to actions proposed
for the U.S., its territorial waters, and the Outer Continental
Shelf."'0 In the 1986 final regulations, the Secretary defined
federal agency action to include only those taken in the U.S. or
upon the high seas.' The Secretary reasoned that section 7 did
not apply abroad because it appeared to have only a domestic
orientation, and would potentially interfere with the sovereignty of
foreign nations."
MII. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1986, the plaintiffs' 23 facially challenged the Secretary's
1986 ESA regulations, which limited the application of section 7
to actions taken domestically. 24 Plaintiffs sued claiming that they
and their members had professional and personal interests in the
performance of section 7 consultations for federal agency actions
which may affect species overseas."2 Defenders of Wildlife
argued that the Secretary's regulations would reduce biodiversity,
and thus would harm them as a conservation organization. 2 6 Dr.
H. Elliott McClure, a member of Defenders of Wildlife and a
wildlife researcher, argued that the regulations would harm
him.'" Dr. McClure alleged emotional harm would result from
an increased risk of extinction to species with which he has
120. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (1983) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402); see 51 Fed. Reg. 19926,
19929 (1986) (explaining genesis of regulations).
121. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1990).
122. 51 Fed. Reg. 19926, 19929 (1986).
123. The plaintiffs-respondents are Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their
Environment, and the Humane Society of the United States.
124. 911 F.2d at 118.
125. Id at 119; Brief for the Respondents at 18, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. CL
2008 (1991) (No. 90-1424).
126. Brief for Respondents at 19.
127. Id at 19-22.
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worked, and professional harm would occur because his researchers
would be unable to continue their work."S Plaintiffs argued that
the Secretary's new regulations violated the ESA. 12
9
B. Procedural Aspects
Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief.30 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota held that plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the
action. 3' Upon appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the court found that
plaintiffs had standing and remanded the case to the district
court.132 In 1989, after further discovery, the district court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merits. 133 The
following year, the Secretary appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which
affirmed the district court's decision.'3 The appeals court ordered
the Secretary to rescind the 1986 regulations, and to publish
regulations requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary
regarding any agency action that may affect endangered or
threatened species, wherever found. 35 In May 1991, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted the Secretary's petition for writ of
certiorari. 13
6
C. The Opinion
Looking both to the ESA's language and legislative history,
Defenders determined that Congress intended that the section 7
consultation requirements concern U.S. federal projects in foreign
128. Id at 21-22.
129. 911 F.2d at 118.
130. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, 851 F.2d 1035,
1035 (8d Cir. 1988).
131. Id at 48.
132. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 1988).
133. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Mim. 1989).
134. 911 F.2d at 125.
135. Id
136. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
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nations. 37 The court used the Chevron test to determine whether
it should defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the ESA. 3 .
The court began applying the Chevron test by examining the
ESA's words to determine if they clearly expressed congressional
intent.139 Defenders first found that section 7 contained expansive
all-inclusive language."g However, the court recognized that
under Mitchell such language is not determinative of congressional
intent.' To discern the congressional purpose for the ESA, the
court turned to TVA. 42 In TVA, the U.S. Supreme Court had
found that legislative intent was clear: the congressional purpose in
enacting the ESA was "to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost."',
43
The court then noted the ESA's numerous references to
international cooperation.'" It reasoned that the Act, viewed as
a whole, clearly demonstrated congressional commitment to
worldwide conservation.1 4' The court concluded that under the
Chevron test, because the congressional intent could be gleaned
from the plain language of the ESA, it owed no deference to the
Secretary's construction.' 41 It cited to Chevron, which held that
the courts are the final authority regarding statutory construction
137. 911 F.2d at 125.
138. ld at 122. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Chevron test).
139. Id.
140. Id "Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species .... ." Id (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
141. 911 F.2d at 122 (citing Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1003-04; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 287-88).
142. Id See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing TVA's interpretation of the ESA).
143. 553 F.2d at 122; TVA, 437 U.S. at 184.
144. 911 F.2d at 122-23. In the ESA, Congress declared that the U.S. has pledged itself as a
sovereign state in the international community to conserve wildlife species facing extinction. 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4). Various international agreements are listed in the Act to guide this pledge:
migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico; the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with
Japan; the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Remisphere;
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean; and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. § 1531(a)(4). The
Act defines endangered species broadly and without geographic limitations. § 1532(5)(B).
145. 911 F.2d at 123.
146. Rd
465
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
and must reject administrative constructions that are contrary to
Congress clear intent.147
To reinforce its conclusion, the court examined the ESA's
legislative history.148 Citing the Secretary's 1978 regulations,
which provided for extraterritorial application, 149 the court noted
that the Secretary justified that interpretation by stressing the
ESA's broad inclusive language, its legislative history, and its
policy implications.'5 Defenders pointed out that after the
Secretary issued the regulations, Congress amended section 7 in
1978, reflecting the present version.15 Looking to the conference
committee report for the 1978 amendments,'52  the court
determined that the committee tacitly approved the 1978
regulations.153 The committee report indicated that Congress did
not intend to make substantive changes to the then existing
law. 4 The court observed that the law, at the time of the 1978
amendments, included the ESA's extraterritorial application. 5 It,
therefore, decided that Congress must have been aware of this state
of the law. 5 6 Thus, after examining the ESA's legislative history,
the court again held that it did not owe any deference to the
Secretary's construction. 15 7
The Eighth Circuit Courf next discussed the Secretary's
justifications for the 1986 amended regulations. The Secretary
supported the change in the regulations by pointing to the apparent
domestic orientation of the consultation and exemption processes
147. Id (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
148. 1& at 123.
149. I at 123-24 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 4871 (1978)).
150. 911 F.2d at 124 (citing Appellants' [Lujan's] app. at 21-25).
151. Id
152. 1d (citing H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9486). "The conferees adopted Senate language creating a new section 7(a),
which essentially restates section 7 of existing law, and outlines the responsibilities of the Secretary
and other Federal agencies for protecting endangered species .... The conferees felt that the Senate
provision retaining existing law, was preferable since regulations governing section 7 are now
familiar to most federal agencies and have received substantial judicial interpretation." I&
153. 1d at 124.
154. Id
155. Id
156. 911 F.2d at 124.
157. 1&
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resulting from the Act's 1978 amendments, 158 as well as the
potential for interference that extraterritorial application would have
on the sovereignty of foreign nations. 159 The court noted that,
under Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,"6 when an
administrative agency reverses existing regulations or policies, the
court must defer to its decision if there appears to have been a
good reason for the change. 61
The Secretary further attempted to support his ESA
interpretation by asserting that Congress could not have intended
to apply the critical habitat provisions only to domestic projects,
while the consultation requirements extend to foreign projects. 62
Once again, the court rejected the Secretary's argument, finding
that the ESA reveals an intent to separately address the concerns
raised by critical habitats and endangered species.163 In addition,
it found that the Secretary's earlier regulations permitted such
differing geographical scopes of the two concerns.'
The Secretary then pointed to language in the ESA which
allows exemptions only if " 'the action is of regional or national
significance' . .. , and require[s] the weighing of public interests
.... ," 5 The court responded by referring, without explanation,
to other language in the exemption provisions: "the Governor of
the State in which an agency action will occur, if any, ... may
158. IM. at 125 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p)) ("Exemptions are granted only if 'the action
is of regional or national significance ... and require the weighing of public interests ....
159. Id
160. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
161. 911 F.2d at 124.
162. Id The habitat clause in section 7 states: "'Each Federal agency shall.., insure that any
action... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical..
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added).
163. 911 F.2d at 124. The court noted that the designation of critical habitat is governed by
different procedures and standards than the listing of endangered species. Id The Secretary is to list
species as endangered or threatened, "'solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available to him .... - 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). In contrast, the standard for critical habitat
designation allows the consideration of "economic impact[s], and any other relevant impact[s]." §
1533(b)(2).
164. 911 F.2d at 125.
165. Id. at 125 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii)) (citing § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii)).
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apply to the Secretary for an exemption." 1" The court
recognized the Secretary's identification of other provisions in the
ESA that purportedly limit the Act's extraterritoriality. 67
However, the court did not discuss these provisions; it only
declared that they did not compel a different result.168 Thus, the
court found the Secretary's reasons for the change inadequate,
when examined in the context of the ESA's language and
history.169 It concluded that deference was not required."
The court then applied the Mitchell test, overcoming the
presumption that statutes only apply domestically.171 It simply
referred to its Chevron test conclusions regarding the ESA's
language and legislative history. 2 Finally, the court rejected the
Secretary's argument that application of the ESA abroad could be
viewed as an intrusion upon the sovereign right of foreign nations
to strike their own balance between the development of natural
resources and the protection of endangered species.17 Defenders
found that the ESA is directed at actions of federal agencies and
not at the actions of sovereign nations.1 74 The Eighth Circuit
rationalized that whether concerns for foreign relations outweigh
concerns for foreign wildlife, the Congress, rather than the
judiciary, should resolve the matter. 5
166. 911 F.2d at 125 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(I)). Plaintiffs argue that the "Governor..
if any" language shows that the ESA applies to agency actions that would not involve any state's
governor, that is, actions in foreign nations. Brief for the Respondents at 37, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008. The Secretary argues that the language simply means that the ESA applies
to agency actions on the Outer Continental Shelf and on the high seas. Brief for the Petitioners at 38
n.28. The court also referred to section 1536(g)(2)(B)(1)(i), which states that "the Secretary shall
promptly ... notify the Governor of each affected State, if any ..... " 911 F.2d at 125.
167. 911 F.2d at 125.
168. Id
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 125; Foley Bro=, 336 U.S. at 281.
172. 911 F.2d at 125.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Upon review of Defenders, the Supreme Court might base its
upcoming decision on an application of the doctrine of deference
to agency interpretations, on the presumption against
extraterritoriality, or on both.
A. The Application of the Doctrine of Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations
In Defenders, the court applied the Chevron test to determine
if it had to defer to the Secretary's 1986 regulations regarding the
ESA. 7 6 To determine whether the Supreme Court will overturn
Defenders, the case must be compared with two recent Supreme
Court cases, Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. American Train
Dispatchers Ass'n" and Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing
Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Companies.7 8 In these two
cases and in Defenders, the courts only applied the first prong of
the Chevron test. This prong requires that when a court reviews an
agency's construction of a statute, it must determine whether
Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue."7 9
If congressional intent is clear, the court ends its analysis:' both
the court and agency must give effect to Congress unambiguously
expressed intent.'' Application of only the first prong of
Chevron is atypical; courts usually cannot resolve cases using the
first prong alone.'82
176. Id. at 122-25.
177. 111 S. CL 1156 (1991).
178. 111 S. Ct. 615 (1991).
179. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
180. Id
181. Id at 843. Chevron noted that "the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent." Id at 843 n.9.
182. Lawrence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 821, 825-26 (1990). Judge Lawrence Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit explains why this is so. Id. He claims that statutes often contain ambiguity when
they are extensively detailed. Id at 826. Such ambiguity precludes the finding of clear legislative
intent. Id Judge Silberman states that even if the courts read a statute thoroughly and carefully,
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The first case in the comparison, Norfolk and Western Railway
Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n [hereinafter Norfolk],
construes title 49, section 11,341(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act.1 83 Section 11,341(a) provides that a corporation participating
in an approved or exempted transaction is excused from
compliance with antitrust laws and from all other law, as necessary
to let that corporation carry out the transaction." 4 The Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) ruled that section 11,341(a) overrode
a collective-bargaining agreement.8 5 A railroad employee's union
appealed the ICC decision. 86 In its first prong analysis, the Court
found that the contested language in section 11,341(a) was clear,
broad, unqualified, and did not indicate any limitation. 18 7 It
fortified this determination by noting that it was consistent with the
statute's consolidation provisions.1 88 The Court thus held that the
disputed exemption included the obligations imposed by the terms
of a collective-bargaining agreement. 9
Norfolk's application of Chevron's first prong is similar in two
ways to the court's reasoning in Defenders. First, both courts
looked to the statutory language and found that Congress clearly
addressed the question at issue." Second, in so doing, both
courts employed traditional tools of statutory construction to
legitimate ambiguities, which give room for differing good faith interpretations appear in cases more
often than not. Id. He continues that if a case is resolved at the Chevron test's first prong, then either
it is a situation where a petitioner has brought a particularly weak case to the court, or "the
[interpreting] agency is sailing directly against a focused legislative wind." I He concludes that
neither of these situations occurs often. I& "In cases citing Chevron, the [Supreme] Court has found
about twice as many statutes ambiguous as unambiguous." Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in AdminLstrative Law, 1988
DUKE LJ. 819, 859 n.185.
183. 111 S. CL at 1158-59; see Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11367.
184. Id at 1162.
185. IM at 1160 (citing CSX Corp.-Control-Chessie System, 4 I.C.C.2d 641, 650 (1988)).
186. Id. at 1161.
187. 1& at 1163-65.
188. 111 S. CL at 1165 (citing Texas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1934)) (The
consolidation provisions of the Act were designed to promote "economy and efficiency in interstate
transportation by the removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure.").
189. Id at 1166.
190. The question at issue in Norfolkwas whether section 11,341(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a), overrode a collective-bargaining agreement.
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determine congressional intent.191 Defenders applied two canons
of construction: the presumption against extraterritoriality,' 92 and
the examination of the Act as a whole.19 Similarly, Norfolk
applied the principles that ejusdem generis94 does not control
when the whole context dictates a different conclusion, and that
repeals of antitrust laws, by implication from a regulatory statute,
are strongly disfavored. 195
However, Norfolk's application of Chevron's first prong also
differs from the Defenders's application. Unlike Defenders, Norfolk
did not look to legislative history to reinforce its conclusion. The
Court simply held that there was a clear statutory command.
196
Perhaps Norfolk did not need to reach the legislative history. It may
have believed that it adequately supported its statutory language
analysis by analogizing to Schwabacher v. United States,97 a
case that construed the immediate precursor to the statute at
issue.'98 On the other hand, perhaps the Supreme Court applied
a strict textualist application of Chevron's first prong.' 99 This
191. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (A court should utilize traditional tools of statutory
construction to determine whether Congress has expressed an intent on the precise question at issue).
192. 911 F.2d at 125.
193. Id at 123.
194. 111 S. CL at 1163. The principle of ejusdem generis provides that when a general term
follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as reference to subjects akin to the one
with specific enumeration. Id (citing Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. CL 415 (1990)).
195. Id (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963)).
196. Id at 1166.
197. 334 U.S. 182 (1948).
198. 111 S. CL at 1164. The immediate precursor of section 11,341(a) was section 7 of the
Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722,54 Stat 898,908-09 (1940) (amending Interstate Commerce Act
§ 5(11)). Norfolk stated that, as in Schwabacher, where the obligations imposed by state contract law
did not survive the merger at issue, the obligations imposed by the law that gives force to the
collective-bargaining agreements does not survive the merger at issue in Norfolk. 111 . CL at 1165.
199. Textualist interpretive theory is based on two interrelated premises. Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-finding Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 VA. L REv. 1295, 1299-1300 (1990). The fist is that the only legitimate source
for statutory interpretation is the text of the statute. Id. The second premise is that legislative history
is not a legitimate source for interpreting statutes. l. The theoretical sources of textualism can be
traced to both a constitutional formalism and insights on the legislative process provided by the law
and economics literature. Id An example of a strict textualist approach is the opinion in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), by Justice Holmes, where the justice looked
specifically to the words of the law at issue to find any clear congressional intent of extraterritoriality.
Commentators refer to the new textualism containing three doctrines as elements: (1) requirement of
clear statement; (2) attachment to plain meaning analysis; and (3) increased deference to
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latter view was shared by the Norfolk dissent, which, unlike the
majority, chose to examine the Interstate Commerce Act's
legislative history.0 °
The second case in the comparison, Mobil Oil Exploration &
Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Companies
[hereinafter Mobil Oil], considers the validity of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) attempt to make changes in the
national market for natural gas.21  Natural gas industry
associations filed actions seeking review of the FERC orders.2°
The Supreme Court examined the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
(NGPA) 0 3 to determine whether Congress intended to give
FERC the authority to set a single ceiling price for old gas.2 4
Applying Chevron's first prong, the Supreme Court held that
Congress intended to allow FERC to set such a ceiling price.20 5
The Court reasoned that the NGPA's structure implied that
Congress left old gas pricing within the discretion of FERC. 216 It
also determined that FERC's decision to set a single ceiling price
was consistent with NGPA restrictions.0 7
administrative agency policy choice in the absence of explicit statutory direction to the contrary.
Mashaw, supra note 68, at 828 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L
REv. 621 (1990)).
200. 111 S. Ct at 1167 (Stevens, I., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
201. 111 S. Ct. at 619. Orders 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986), and 451-A, 51 Fed. Reg.
46,762 (1986), were at issue. These orders had three principal components: (1) collapsing the fifteen
existing vintage price categories of old gas into a single classification and establishing an alternative
maximum price for a producer of gas in that category to charge (to willing buyers); (2) establishing
a good faith negotiation procedure that producers must follow before they can collect a higher price
from current pipeline customers; and (3) rejecting suggestions that it undertake completely to resolve
the issue of take-or-pay provisions in certain natural gas contracts in the same proceeding in which
it addressed old gas pricing. II S. C. at 621-22.
202. 111 S. Ct. at 615.
203. Pub. L No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3352 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988)).
204. 111 S. Ct. at 622-23. The term "old gas" means old gas contracts. The term originated
in the two-tiered gas pricing system (vintage pricing or vintaging). let at 619-20 (citing Statement
of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960) (Fed. Power Comm'n)).
205. Id. at 623.
206. 1d
207. Id. at 624. The NGPA restrictions provide that a ceiling price must be higher than the old
vintage ceiling prices carried over from the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(2)(A), 3316(c)(1),
and that price ceilings must be "just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act."
111 S. CL at 624 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(2)(B), 3316(c)(2)).
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As in Norfolk, the Court in Mobil Oil found that Congress had
unambiguously expressed its intent in the plain language of the
statute in question, without reinforcement from legislative
history." 8 The Court simply quoted, "If the statute is clear and
unambiguous, 'that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.' "" Thus, not looking to the legislative
history, Mobil Oil-as in Norfolk, but unlike Defenders-followed a
strict textualist approach.210 Perhaps this difference exists because
the analysis in Defenders is not formalistic, and therefore did not
apply a strict textualist approach.21
However, Defenders, after concluding that it found
congressional intent in the ESA's words, did temper its legislative
history analysis by asserting that it was simply used to reinforce its
conclusion.212 In that event, the court's legislative history analysis
was just superfluous. But, if Defenders cannot stand solely on the
strength of its analysis of the ESA's words, then its Chevron test
application is not consistent with the Supreme Court's strict
textualist approach. As such, the court's analysis will not be
upheld. Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court may overturn
Defenders.
B. The Application of the Doctrine of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
In addition to considering judicial deference, the Supreme
Court, in reviewing Defenders, might also apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Since this presumption is a canon of
statutory construction, its application has a direct effect on
208. 111 S. Ct. at 622-23.
209. Id, at 623 (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) (quoting K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988))).
210. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of textualism).
211. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (noting that the district court in Defenders
is less formalist than the U.S. Supreme Court and did not apply a strict textualist approach).
212. 911 F.2d at 123.
473
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
Chevron's first prong analysis.213 The differences in approach to
this presumption, between the Defenders opinion and the Supreme
Court's past decisions, strongly suggest that the Court may overturn
Defenders.
Commentary about Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, which held
that the ESA applies abroad, has argued that this was not the result
that the traditional presumption against extraterritoriality would
have mandated.214 This commentary concluded that a more
formalist court (such as, the U.S. Supreme Court), could apply a
strict textualist application of the presumption and reach a contrary
result.21 This outcome can be predicted by examining the
recently decided cases of Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.2"6 and Amlon Metals
v. FMC.
217
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co. [hereinafter Aramco], the Supreme Court applied
its most recent interpretation of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Aramco considers a Title VW s action, brought
by a U.S. citizen against his U.S. employers, Arabian American Oil
Company and Aramco Services Company. 219 The plaintiff
charged that while he was working abroad, the employers
discriminated against him because of his race, religion, and national
origin. 2° Interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court applied a
213. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' use of canons of
statutory construction in the Chevron test's frust prong analysis). Chevron's frust prong requires that
a court, when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, must determine whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
214. See Turley, supra note 14, at 661 n.400 (discussing the district court's decision in
Defenders, 707 F. Supp. at 1084-86). Professor Turley states that the district court's decision is
clearly the correct interpretative result. Id The traditional presumption provides that a law will not
have extraterritorial application when the particular law's nature does not mandate such application.
Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1002.
215. Turley, supra note 14, at 661 n.400.
216. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
217. 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
218. Title VII provides that discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1988).
219. 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
220. Id.
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strict textualist approach, looking only to the statute's
language. 1 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's evidence,
while probative of a plausible interpretation, did not overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.'m It concluded that the
statutory language relied upon by the citizen was ambiguous and
did not speak directly to the question presented in the case.'
Thus, the Court held that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially
to regulate employment practices of U.S. employers who employ
U.S. citizens abroad. 4
Aramco's strict textualist approach differs from the analysis
undertaken in Defenders because it applied a clear statement rule
instead of the traditional Mitchell test.' This rule provides that a
statute has extraterritorial application only if the affirmative
intention of Congress is clearly expressed in the words of the
statute. 6 The Court in Aramco reasoned that when Congress
wants a statute to apply extraterritorially, it knows how to do so;
Congress is aware of the need to clearly state that a statute applies
extraterritorially. 7 Under this clear statement rule, the court
looks primarily to the statute's language." This rule differs from
the traditional presumption, stated in Mitchell, which provides that
a statute is meant to apply only domestically, unless a contrary
intent appears either in the statute's words or legislative
history.? Unlike the clear statement rule, when a court applies
the Mitchell test it may consider the legislative history."
221. I& at 1230-36.
222. Id at 1231.
223. Id.
224. 111 S. CL at 1229.
225. I& at 1235. See Jacqueline . Bailey, Note, TIle VII Protections Do Not Extend To
Americans Working Overseas. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co, II S. CL 1227 (1991)., 5
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 417, 441 (1992) (describing Aramco's clear statement rule, which excludes
legislative history analysis, as a change from previous Supreme Court decisions that looked to
legislative history when it considered the presumption against extraterritoriality).
226. 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
227. I. at 1235.
228. Id. at 1230-36.
229. Id at 1237 (Marshall, L., dissenting) (joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.).
230. See id. at 1238 (discussing Foley Bro&, 336 U.S. at 285).
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In the event that the Supreme Court applies its recent clear
statement rule, and looks only to the ESA's language, it will
probably find that the ESA's language does not overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. In such a case, while the
Court will likely admit that both plaintiffs and the Secretary set
forth plausible arguments, it will not choose between competing
interpretations, as would be required in the absence of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 1 That each interpretation
is plausible only shows that the ESA's language is ambiguous."
Thus, plaintiffs will not make the required affirmative showing of
clear intent. 3 For example, the ESA's section 7 limits the
entities that may apply for an exemption to: the agency undertaking
the action, the applicant of a permit or license, and "the Governor
of the State in which an agency action will occur, if any ...
.2 Plaintiffs argued that the "if any" language suggests that
activities in foreign countries are covered by the ESA. 235 The
Secretary made the equally plausible argument that this phrase
assumes coverage of activities on the Outer Continental Shelf and
on the high seas. 6 The Supreme Court will not have to choose
between these competing interpretations because, just as in Aramco,
both interpretations are plausible, proving that the statutory
language is ambiguous.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco, the
Southern District Court of New York decided Amlon Metals, Inc.
v. FMC Corp. [hereinafter Amlon Metals], also applying the
231. See, e.g., 111 S. Ct. at 1231. The Court did not need to choose between competing
interpretations as it would be required to do in the absence of the presumption against extraterritorial
application. L "'Each [interpretation] is plausible, but no more persuasive than that. The language
relied upon by the petitioners-and it is they who must make the affirmative showing-is ambiguous,
and does not speak directly to the question presented here." Md
232. Id
233. Id
234. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1).
235. 911 F.2d at 125.
236. See Brief for the Petitioner at 38 n.28, Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 111 S. Ct. 2008
(1991) (No. 90-1424).
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presumption against extraterritoriality. 7 However, in Amlon
Metals, the court deviated from Aramco's strict textualist approach.
Amlon Metals addresses the issue of whether the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)238 extends to waste
located within the territory of another sovereign nation." Amlon
Metals first reasoned that the plaintiffs did not produce adequate
evidence of legislative history to support their view that RCRA
applied abroad.24 Next, it found that the plaintiffs adduced little
evidence suggesting that the structure and language of RCRA
supported their view.24 Therefore, Amlon Metals held that the
plaintiffs did not overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 24
2
Amlon Metals's application of this presumption is similar to the
Defenders's analysis. Although Amlon Metals cited Aramco, it
237. 775 F. Supp. 668, 672. Other recent decisions involving the presumption against
extraterritoriality are Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991)
(mem.) (holding that the National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988)), does not apply to the National Science Foundation's
decision to build incinerators in Antarctica); and Smith v. United States, 932 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), does not apply to torts
occurring in Antarctica).
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991.
239. 775 P. Supp. at 672. The case stemmed from a commercial contract for the recycling of
copper residue produced by the defendant, FMC, a Delaware corporation. Id at 669. Amlon Metals,
one of the plaintiffs and a New York corporation, was an agent for two United Kingdom
corporations, the other plaintiffs. Id Ailon Metals procured from FMC copper residue which'was
shipped to the United Kingdom. Id The residue contained harmful chemicals. Id at 670. The
plaintiffs alleged that FMC misrepresented the composition and characteristics of the residue and
failed to disclose the presence and concentrations of chemicals in the materials. Id at 670.
240. Id at 674. The plaintiffs presented two pieces of evidence. The first were remarks made
by Congresswoman Mikulski that the U.S. should take a firm stand on the transportation of hazardous
waste bound for export to other countries. Id The second were remarks made by Senator Mitchell
that no American ally or trading partner should be saddled with U.S. wastes that it does not want or
cannot handle in an environmentally sound manner. Id The court found that these remarks did not
refer to RCRA's remedial provisions. Id
241. Id at 674-75. To support their view, the plaintiffs pointed to two aspects of RCRA, the
export provision and the use of the term "any person" in the citizen suit provision. Id at 675. The
court found that the export and citizen suit provisions were discussed separately by the legislature,
and a domestic emphasis attached to the remedial provision. Id As for the "any person" language,
the court held that it does not establish the extraterritorial application of RCRA, since other portions
of the citizen suit provision reflect a domestic focus. Id at 675.
242. Id at 676.
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actually applied the Mitchell test." 3 Unlike the Aramco opinion,
to find congressional intent Amlon Metals looked beyond the
statute's language to the legislative history.244 The different
conclusions reached in Defenders and Amlon Metals stem not from
a different analytical approach, but rather from the differences
between the ESA and RCRA. For example, both courts looked to
the findings enumerated in the respective statutes. 241 While the
RCRA findings "characterize- the problem of waste disposal as 'a
matter national in scope and concern,' ,246 the ESA characterizes
the problem of species extinction as worldwide in scope.247
Therefore, although the Defenders analysis differs from the
Supreme Court's in Aramco, the traditional Mitchell test seems to
have survived Aramco, as suggested by Amlon Metals. However,
Amlon Metals clearly misapplies the rule regarding the presumption
against extraterritoriality, as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Aramco. Instead of only looking for a clear statement in the
statutory language, Amlon Metals considered the legislative history
as well. In contrast, in reviewing Defenders, the Supreme Court
will probably apply its clear statement rule from Aramco. The
Court will likely end its analysis after looking at the ESA language,
finding it ambiguous at best. Without finding a clear congressional
statement that the Act applies extraterritorially, the Court will
inevitably reverse Defenders.
V. CONCLUSION
Defenders, in determining whether the court should defer to the
Secretary's 1986 interpretation to limit the ESA's applicability to
the U.S. and the high seas, applied the first prong of the test in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
However, recently the Supreme Court has ignored the legislative
history in applying the Chevron test, and looked only to the plain
243. Id. at 672.
244. 775 F. Supp. at 674.
245. Id. at 675; 911 F.2d at 122.
246. Id. at 675 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4)).
247. 911 F.2d at 122-23 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4), (a)(5), (b)).
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meaning of the statutory language. Unlike the Supreme Court's
recent Chevron test applications, the Eighth Circuit included the
ESA's legislative history in its analysis. Since the Eighth Circuit
purported to only reinforce its statutory language analysis with the
legislative history, perhaps this variation from the Supreme Court's
analysis is not significant.
Regardless of the way the Supreme Court concludes the
Chevron test, it will most likely overturn Defenders. Because the
Supreme Court is formalist, consistent with its recent decision in
Aramco, it will probably take a strict textualist approach in
addressing the presumption against extraterritoriality. The Court
will likely find that the ESA's language regarding its applicability
abroad is ambiguous. In that event, the Supreme Court will hold
that Defenders of Wildlife did not rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Consequently, if the ESA is to apply to U.S.
federal agency actions in foreign nations, Congress will have to
enact the appropriate legislation."4
Bradley J. Epstein
248. See, e.g., Bailey, note 225, at 442 n.188 (describing how the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 StaL 1071 (1991), reversed the Supreme Court's holding inAramco, that
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17, did not apply extraterritorially to
U.S. firms employing Americans abroad).
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14 10:05 a.m.
15 APPEARANCES:
16 EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
17 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
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19 BRIAN B. O'NEILL, ESQ., Minneapolis, Minnesota; on
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*This transcript was reprinted with the permission of Alderson Reporting Company, 1111 14th
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005-5650.
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Reporting Company: page numbers (as indicated in the upper right comer), line numbers, and text
are the same as officially reported.
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1 PROCEEDINGS
2 (10:05 a.m.)
3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4 first this morning in No. 90-1424, Manuel Lujan v. The
5 Defenders of Wildlife.
6 Mr. Kneedler.
7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9 MR. KNEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and
10 may it please the Court:
11 The Eighth Circuit, in this case invalidated a
12 regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 1986
13 to interpret the geographic reach of the first sentence of
14 section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
15 That sentence provides that each Federal agency,
16 in consultation with the Secretary, shall ensure that any
17 action it authorizes, funds, or carries out, is not likely
18 to have either one of two consequences: first, jeopardize
19 an endangered or threatened species or, second, adversely
20 modify habitat that is determined by the Secretary, after
21 consultation with affected States, to be critical for the
22 species.
23 The Secretary, from the outset, has construed
24 the portion of section 7(a)(2) that concerns critical
25 habitat of a species not to apply in foreign countries,
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1 because the reference to affected States gives it a
2 domestic focus, and because application in foreign
3 countries would present practical difficulties and impose
4 this Nation's environmental laws and land use planning on
5 foreign countries. Neither respondents nor the courts
6 below have challenged that construction.
7 In the 1986 interpretive regulation at issue
8 here, the Secretary concluded, for similar reasons, that
9 the portion of the same sentence that concerns actions
10 that affect the species themselves likewise does not apply
11 in foreign countries.
12 The court of appeals invalidated that
13 interpretation, thereby setting aside the uniform
14 interpretation of not only the agencies charged with
15 administering the act, but also the agencies engaged in
16 furnishing assistance to foreign governments for projects
17 in their countries.
18 The court of appeals erred in two fundamental
19 respects. First, the court should not have even reached
20 the merits of the validity of the regulation, because the
21 respondent organizations do not have standing to challenge
22 it. The respondent organizations wholly failed to carry
23 their burden of showing that any of their members suffered
24 actual or threatened injury as the result of U.S.
25 assistance to a project in a foreign country affecting
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1 their ability to view wildlife.
2 QUESTION: Mr. Kneedler, how does the citizens'
3 suit provisions affect the standing inquiry?
4 MR. KNEEDLER: In the first place, we think the
5 citizen suit provision is inapplicable in this case
6 because that refers to situations generally where persons
7 alleged to be in violation of the act. The Secretary's
8 interpretive regulation, which he wasn't even required to
9 issue in the first place, in our view, does not fall
10 within the citizens' suit provision.
11 The provision that addresses the Secretary's
12 enforcement responsibilities, which is what respondents
13 seem to be directing their suit to, does not govern this
14 sort of regulation. It governs a specific category of
15 regulations under section 4 of the act. So in the first
16 place, we think the citizens' suit provision is
17 inapplicable here.
18 But moreover, the citizens' suit provision, as
19 this Court has made clear in Sea Clammers and other cases,
20 cannot extend the standing -- the jurisdiction, case or
21 controversy requirement -- jurisdiction under the case or
22 controversy requirement beyond that specified in this
23 Court's cases.
24 So the --
25 QUESTION: Well, I guess it could, though,
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1 provide that abridgement of the right that Congress has
2 given would constitute injury.
3 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, what would be -- to be
4 sure, if the statute defines a statutory right and then
5 says that a person may sue for a violation --
6 QUESTION: Yes.
7 MR. KNEEDLER: -- of that right, then standing
8 would result because Congress has defined the right.
9 But this -- the citizens' suit provision does
10 not define any substantive rights. Just as this Court
11 said in Valley Forge, the APA provision, giving any person
12 aggrieved a right to sue, does not define substantive
13 rights, it simply creates a cause of action.
14 So respondents would be required to look
15 elsewhere in the Endangered Species Act for any
16 substantive rights that they would seek to invoke in this
17 case.
18 At one point, respondents were arguing that they
19 had certain procedural rights to have one agency consult
20 with another regarding projects in foreign countries. As
21 we pointed out in our petition and brief, that holding by
22 the Eighth Circuit to that effect was inconsistent with
23 every other court of appeals that has considered it. And
24 respondents do not, as we understand it, defend it here,
25 because procedural rights can only be invoked by persons
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1 who have a substantive stake in the agency's decision.
2 So unless respondents can show that some of
3 their members had an actual stake in a foreign project and
4 were injured there, the fact that there might be
5 procedural provisions under the act would not be
6 sufficient to give them standing.
7 So to come back to your question, and argue this
8 case does not arise under the citizens' suit provision.
9 It's essentially an APA challenge to a regulation. And as
10 such, as a -- if the A -- regulation is the agency action,
11 this Court has made clear, just two terms ago in the
12 National Wildlife Federation case, that unless a statute
13 specifically provides for a -- challenge to a regulation
14 as soon as it's issued, ordinarily a person has to wait
15 until the regulation has been applied to his particular
16 case.
17 QUESTION: Well, I understood the respondents to
18 argue that section 7(a)(2) provides that each Federal
19 agency shall consult with the Secretary when action or
20 funding is likely to jeopardize the continuation of an
21 endangered species.
22 MR. KNEEDLER: That's correct.
23 QUESTION: And they think that is the
24 substantive right that they're seeking to enforce under
25 the citizens' suit provision.
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1 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, if an agency that was
2 otherwise required to do so did not consult or took action
3 that would jeopardize a species, that would be a violation
4 of the act.
5 But again, respondents have not sued an action
6 agency, seeking prevent what they claim would be a
7 violation of the act by that agency -- the engaging in a
8 project in a foreign country without the necessary
9 consultation.
10 They've sued the Secretary of the Interior, who
11 has simply issued an interpretive regulation stating what
12 he believes to be the content of the section 7(a)(2)
13 requirement. But the -- but the Secretary of the Interior
14 cannot require another agency to consult with the
15 Secretary about a project.
16 So whatever may be the case in a dispute about a
17 particular project, which, again, we don't have here --
18 QUESTION: We did. Do you think that the
19 citizens' suit provision would enable a citizen to sue
20 because the -- a Federal agency had failed to consult?
21 MR. KNEEDLER: It would confer a right of
22 action. But again, the article Ill standing requirements
23 would have to be met. And as this Court has made clear,
24 there are three essential standing requirements that, even
25 under a citizens' suit, a plaintiff has to meet.
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1 First, the plaintiff must show that he has
2 suffered some actual or threatened injury; second, he must
3 show that that injury is fairly traceable to the
4 challenged action; and third, he must show that that
5 injury -- there's a likelihood that that injury will be
6 redressed by a decision in his favor.
7 And we've shown in our brief that respondents
8 here satisfy none of those requirements with respect to
9 any of their members, in foreign countries.
10 Respondents, in their brief, focus on two of
11 Defenders' members in an effort to establish
12 standing -- excuse me, focus on five. The court of
13 appeals found standing only on the basis of two. It
14 rejected the third, Mr. Plowden, on the ground that he
15 hadn't even gotten within 200 miles of the project in
16 question. And any nexus that the remaining two might have
17 had to a project was so insubstantial that the court of
18 appeals didn't even address it.
19 So this case -- respondent's standing would
20 depend entirely on the ability to establish that two
21 members that the court of appeals focused on had standing
22 in their own right. And those two members fail each step.
23 These two are Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred.
24 Joyce Kelly's entire basis for standing is one
25 paragraph in an affidavit that appears at one -- page 101
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1 of the joint appendix. In that -- in her affidavit, Joyce
2 Kelly makes no allegation that on her visit to the Nile
3 River in 1986 she was harmed at all in her viewing of any
4 endangered species. All she says was that I will suffer
5 harm.
6 And with respect to future injuries, she says I
7 will suffer harm as a result of U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
8 assistance in rehabilitating the Aswan Dam Hydroelectric
9 Power -- Power Plant. There's no indication in her
10 affidavit, or in the Bureau of Reclamation report which
11 she references, that that rehabilitation would have any
12 effect, whatever, on an endangered species, and
13 specifically, the Nile crocodile.
14 Moreover, Joyce Kelly has not shown that she
15 actually has firm plans to return to Egypt. All she says
16 is that I have observed the traditional habitat of the
17 Nile crocodile, and I intend to do so again. I plan to
18 return to Egypt.
19 QUESTION: Does she say when she observed --
20 MR. KNEEDLER: She did not say when she
21 intended to return to Egypt. It's --
22 QUESTION: Did she say when in the past she had
23 observed it?
24 MR. KNEEDLER: She said that she had travelled
25 to Egypt in 1986.
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1 Now -- so she hasn't shown either actual injury
2 in the past -- she didn't claim it -- or future injury.
3 Because, as this Court has said, with respect to
4 threatened injury, the threat has to be real and
5 immediate. The injury has to be certainly
6 impending -- which suggests that any injury has to be
7 immediately forthcoming. The sort of vague, unspecific
8 allegation or assertion that Joyce Kelly makes here, that
9 she intends to return sometime in the future, falls far
10 short of that necessary to establish a concrete threat of
11 future injury.
12 QUESTION: What would -- could she possibly
13 satisfy? What if she'd actually seen some crocodiles, and
14 she said they're going to be building the dam until 1991
15 and she plans to go back in 1990, or something. Would
16 that have been enough?
17 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, first of all, the mere fact
18 that she visited in the past is not, alone, enough, as
19 this court said in Lyons. If this was a damage action, a
20 past -- past injury may be relevant. But for future
21 injunctive relief, the past injury is not sufficient.
22 But with respect to future injury, we think at a
23 minimum there has to be a definitive and concrete plan.
24 And picking up on this Court's language that the
25 threatened injury has to be real and immediate, we think
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1 that the -- that the injury -- that the threatened
2 injury--
3 QUESTION: Well, how could the injury -- I mean,
4 the project is going to take several years to complete.
5 And she couldn't be injured -- her theory is that she's
6 injured by the completion of the project, as I understand.
7 It may kill off the crocodiles.
8 And if she's seen crocodiles the last time, she
9 says sometime a couple of years from now, she wants to go
10 back and take pictures of them and make studies, that
11 wouldn't be enough?
12 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, there are two aspects of
13 the injury problem. One is the threat that the agency's
14 project might have an effect on species. But there's the
15 further requirement that she, personally, suffer injury.
16 And if she doesn't plan to visit the project for 5
17 years --
18 QUESTION: Well, let's get one thing I'm
19 troubled by. Supposing the injury is she won't be able to
20 see any more crocodiles. She likes to look at crocodiles
21 or make studies of them. Is that an injury that's
22 cognizable?
23 MR. KNEEDLER: It is the sort of injury, yes,
24 that would be cognizable under the act.
25 QUESTION: Well, then why does she have to say
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1 any more than she thinks there's a danger that if you
2 don't consult and you don't avoid the environmental hazard
3 and so on and so forth, the crocodiles may become extinct,
4 and I can't see any more crocodiles?
5 MR. KNEEDLER: She would have to show both that
6 and the--
7 QUESTION: She'd have to prove that there would
8 be the adverse consequence. I thought the statute was
9 designed to avoid -- you know, minimize the danger that
10 that would happen.
11 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, she would have to show,
12 at least, that there was a likelihood of some -- of some
13 adverse impact. That's the standard that triggers the
14 consultation requirement in the first place.
15 So if she's relying just on injury to the
16 species, rather than her use of the land, which she's not
17 alleging here -- just injury to the species, she would
18 have to show some injury to the species.
19 But beyond that, she would also have to show --
20 QUESTION: She's kind of asked to do her own
21 environmental impact study.
22 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, but she is the one who's
23 claiming the injury. The burden is on her.
24 QUESTION: Well, I think she -- relying on risk
25 of injury unless adequate is made first to determine
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1 whether or not those injuries would occur. That's not
2 enough, in your view. She has to -- she has the
3 affmnative burden of establishing injury as a result of
4 the project.
5 MR. KNEEDLER: At least a likelihood of injury,
6 we submit. And again, the -- under this Court's standing
7 doctrine, the Court has reiterated just last term, the
8 Court presumes it doesn't have jurisdiction unless it
9 affirmatively appears in the record, and it's up to the
10 person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to show the
11 injury.
12 So in this case, she has to show some injury.
13 And a risk to animals does not translate into injury to a
14 human being.
15 QUESTION: Wouldn't she also have to at least
16 suggest how the Bureau's -- Bureau of Reclamation's
17 involvement in this dam might hurt the crocodile?
18 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes, she would. She would have
19 to show that if she was challenging the project itself --
20 again, she's challenging a regulation, which is even one
21 more step removed. But assuming she was challenging the
22 regulation -- I mean the project -- she would have to show
23 that the injury is fairly traceable to the Bureau of
24 Reclamation's assistance, and would be likely to be cured
25 by either a withdrawal of the assistance or consultation,
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1 or at least by the withdrawal of the assistance.
2 And that she can't show, both because the Bureau
3 of Reclamation is an independent actor. But beyond that,
4 we have here foreign sovereigns who have it within their
5 own power, as respondents concede, to go forward or not to
6 go forward, to seek funding from other sources.
7 So -- but going back to the --
8 QUESTION: She is not challenging the repair of
9 the Aswan -- the specific project. She is just
10 challenging a regular -- an interpretive regulation issued
11 by the Secretary of the Interior.
12 MR. KNEEDLER: That -- that's correct. And the
13 same thing is true with Amy Skilbred, with respect to the
14 Mahaweli project. She hasn't brought this suit to try to
15 enjoin the -- U.S. AID from furnishing assistance to the
16 Mahaweli project. She's brought this suit to challenge an
17 interpretive regulation -- or the respondent organizations
18 have. And they have used these two projects as being
19 illustrative of the sort of projects that the U.S. may
20 engage in overseas.
21 But the fact that the respondents have
22 challenged the Secretary's regulation, and the court
23 entertained the suit in that context, really converts the
24 court of appeals' disagreement with the Secretary's
25 interpretation into nothing more than an advisory opinion.
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1 Because these respondents do not --
2 QUESTION: Would it be part of -- would it be
3 part of her burden to also prove that the foreign
4 government could no get financing elsewhere? Because I
5 guess it's always -- there's always a possibility that the
6 government could build its own dams and all the rest of it
7 without American money.
8 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, the --
9 QUESTION: Would that be part of her burden?
10 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes, it would. And in fact, when
11 it comes to the actions of a foreign country, we think
12 that as a matter of law, she could not show that, for
13 reasons derived from this Court's act of state and
14 political question doctrines. A U.S. court should not
15 presume to decide and receive evidence on the question of
16 whether a foreign sovereign is likely or not likely to
17 undertake a project on its own soil with -- seeking other
18 foreign assistance.
19 But beyond that, under this -- under this
20 Court's decisions in Allen v. Wright and Simon v. Eastern
21 Kentucky Welfare, even in a wholly domestic context, the
22 Court has made clear that, at the very least, the
23 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the actions of
24 a third party are so likely to happen that the injury will
25 be redressed by the relief. And respondents have fallen
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1 wholly short in this case of showing that.
2 In fact, this is a particularly improbable case
3 for making such a showing. The Mahaweli project -- the
4 U.S. Government has furnished less than 10 percent of the
5 overall assistance to that project.
6 QUESTION: Where is the Mahaweli project?
7 MR. KNEEDLER: I'm sorry. It's in Sri Lanka on
8 the Mahaweli River in Sri Lanka.
9 So -- and again, Amy Skilbred did not allege
10 that she suffered any injury with -- on her visit to Sri
11 Lanka and her ability to view wildlife back in 1981. And
12 she also said in her deposition, at pages 65 to 67, that
13 she had no concrete plans to return.
14 She said she hoped to return some day, but she
15 had no concrete plans. Again, the requirement of a
16 threatened injury -- going back to Justice Stevens'
17 question -- is not just the threat that the agency's
18 action will have some impact on species, but also that
19 she, personally, will suffer the injury which, at the very
20 least, requires a showing that the visit to the foreign
21 project is imminent, and therefore that the injury is
22 imminent.
23 Should the Court disagree with our position that
24 the respondent organizations do not have standing in this
25 case, it would then be necessary to reach the merits of
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1 the scope, geographic scope, of section 7(a)(2). In our
2 -- in our view, the court of appeals seriously erred in
3 its resolution of the merits, as well.
4 This Court reiterated --
5 QUESTION: Mr. Kneedler, is there any other way
6 we might, one day, reach that question?
7 MR. KNEEDLER: It's possible that that could
8 arise, if -- for example, if there was a project
9 undertaken directly by the foreign government -- I mean,
10 excuse me -- by the U.S. agency, not a foreign government,
11 which is not the case here. For example, a U.S.-
12 constructed project in a foreign country, and a plaintiff
13 showed the requisite personal injury, actual injury.
14 Then, just as in the Teleco Dam case in a domestic
15 project, we think it's possible that a plaintiff would
16 have standing. So this -- our position here does not rule
17 out that possibility.
18 But in a situation such as this, where the
19 project is undertaken by the foreign government, only with
20 the financial assistance of the U.S. Government, we think
21 that the elements of causation and redressability are far
22 too attenuated.
23 But on the merits, the Court reiterated just
24 last term in the ARAMCO case, that it's an established
25 principle of American law that acts of Congress are
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1 presumed not to apply in foreign countries, absent an
2 affirmative intention of Congress to the contrary that has
3 been clearly expressed.
4 QUESTION: Mr. Kneedler, if in place of Sri
5 Lanka and Egypt this were Antarctica, what would be your
6 position?
7 MR. KNEEDLER: The same position. It's outside
8 -- it's outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
9 States.
10 QUESTION: But no foreign country?
11 MR. KNEEDLER: But no foreign country.
12 Now, we had taken the position that the
13 consultation requirement applies on the high seas. I --
14 let me correct that. I'm not sure that we've taken a
15 position on whether it would apply in Antarctica. I know
16 I've taken the position that NEPA does not apply there, so
17 I would assume that we would take the same position here.
18 But I'm not certain.
19 QUESTION: Well, you have taken the position it
20 applies on the high seas?
21 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes, we have.
22 QUESTION: And yet there's no clear statement to
23 that effect in the statute --
24 MR. KNEEDLER: There's not -- and of course,
25 that's not in issue here. But we think that some support
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1 for that can be obtained from what is the closely parallel
2 provision of the act that governs the taking of endangered
3 species.
4 The section 9(a)(1) of the act prohibits the
5 taking of protected species by a person subject to the
6 jurisdiction of the United States, either when it's in the
7 territory of the United States, or on the high seas. But
8 conspicuously absent, missing from the statute, is any
9 prohibition against the taking of a species in a foreign
10 country, presumably because the regulation of the taking
11 of species in a foreign country would be something that
12 would be subject to the laws of that country, which was
13 something that the CITES, the Convention on International
14 Trade in Endangered Species, makes clear, that the
15 trade --
16 QUESTION: But presumably, there's no law in
17 Antarctica, anyway.
18 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, in Antarctica, but in terms
19 of the general proposition, in foreign countries there
20 would be such law. And on the high seas, there's no
21 governing law, and therefore no direct conflict with the
22 controlling law of another sovereign.
23 QUESTION: Well, Mr. Kneedler, the 1978
24 amendments presume that some agency action will be
25 taken -- will take place outside of any State, and outside
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1 of any circuit.
2 MR. KNEEDLER: That's correct, in the judicial
3 review provisions --
4 QUESTION: Yes.
5 MR. KNEEDLER: -- and the consultation
6 provisions. But that falls far short of suggesting that
7 it covers actions in foreign countries. Again, this ties
8 into the position that it could apply in territories --
9 QUESTION: Well, it certainly isn't clear that
10 it's limited to the Outer Continental Shelf. I think
11 that's kind of an odd interpretation. It must mean
12 something.
13 MR. KNEEDLER: Well --
14 QUESTION: Didn't the Secretary take the
15 position for some years that it did apply overseas?
16 MR. KNEEDLER: The Secretary -- the Secretary
17 initially took the position in 1978 regulations that it
18 did. But that position was greatly objected to by the
19 State Department, Defense Department, and others.
20 The Solicitor of the Interior promptly ordered a
21 reconsideration of that in 1979. And that official
22 position of the Interior Department was reversed in 1981.
23 And then in nine -- in these 1986 regulations, that new
24 position was stated.
25 Now, under Chevron, that agency position is
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1 entitled to considerable deference. And it is not -- it
2 does not fatally undermine that position that the
3 Secretary changed positions. He had good reasons for
4 doing so. One thing --
5 QUESTION: Weren't they due to a change in the
6 administration, in your view?
7 MR. KNEEDLER: No, what -- the opinion itself
8 states that the precipitating factor or the basis in the
9 statutory text was the 1978 amendments to the Endangered
10 Species Act, which simply reconfirmed the domestic focus
11 of,section 7. Section 7 as originally passed referred
12 only to affected States.
13 In 1978, Congress adopted an elaborate exemption
14 provision to allow for projects to go forward,
15 notwithstanding the strict, substantive standard in
16 section 7. And those elaborate exemption provisions,
17 themselves, have a domestic focus, by providing for a
18 representative of an affected State on the Endangered
19 Species Committee, by providing for notification to the
20 Governor of the affected State, but not the foreign
21 countries.
22 But again, going back to Justice O'Connor's
23 question, the reference to the State, if any, in which the
24 action occurs, is certainly far less compelling, frankly,
25 than the alien exemption under title VII in last term's
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1 ARAMCO case. And yet the Court found that to be -- to be
2 insufficient to overcome the presumption that the act does
3 not apply.
4 Again, the burden is on the respondents in this
5 case to show that Congress affirmatively intended the act
6 to apply overseas. They've pointed to nothing in the text
7 of section 7 or 7(a)(2), nothing in the legislative
8 history of section 7(a)(2), and nothing in the background
9 of the conventions that the Endangered Act was designed to
10 implement, to support the contention that Congress
11 specifically intended section 7(a)(2) to apply overseas.
12 That, in our view, is the end of the matter, as
13 it was in ARAMCO because an affirmative indication is
14 required. But even --
15 QUESTION: They do have the argument, don't
16 they, that the interpretation that it applied abroad had
17 issued before the -- statute was amended and was amended
18 without -- without comment on that? So it's an argument
19 that they assumed that it applied overseas.
20 MR. KNEEDLER: But there's no indication that
21 Congress was aware of that interpretation. And again,
22 given the presumption, it has to be Congress, itself, that
23 affirmatively chooses to extend --
24 QUESTION: Is there a presumption that Congress
25 would be aware of regulations implementing an earlier
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1 statute?
2 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, this Court has, on
3 occasion, looked to that fact. But particularly in this
4 context, where there's no affirmative indication, at all,
5 that Congress was aware of it, much less that it wanted
6 to--
7 QUESTION: No, I know there's no affirm -- I'm
8 just asking if there's a presumption that Congress knows
9 what the law is.
10 MR. KNEEDLER: I don't know that it's a
11 presumption in the sense that it's a legal presumption
12 that operates here. There is an assumption, I guess, in
13 certain situations. But I think that that -- that that
14 background is simply not involved here. The respondents
15 rely on a passage in the conference report on the 1978
16 amendments, for example, that refer to the conferees'
17 decision to retain language in the Senate bill.
18 Well, what the Senate bill was proposing to
19 delete, that the conference report language refers to, was
20 the whole reference to consultation between agencies and
21 the Secretaries.
22 Well, that's -- that -- that perhaps inadvertent
23 deletion of the whole consultation process is something
24 quite different from suggesting that Congress intended to
25 apply this specific provision of the act overseas.
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1 Again, the reference in section 7(a)(2) of the
2 act, itself, to affected States, gives that section --
3 gives that sentence a domestic focus. And respondents
4 here, are trying to make the improbably argument that
5 Congress, in another portion. of the very same sentence
6 intended the agency's obligations to have a vastly
7 different geographic reach, since the critical habitat
8 portion of that sentence concededly does not apply in
9 foreign countries. Yet, they're arguing that the
10 protection for the species, themselves, the species that
11 would use that habitat, does apply in foreign countries.
12 It's also important to point out the practical
13 difficulties and serious interference with foreign
14 relations that would result from applying section 7(a)(2)
15 in this setting. And those are concerns that were
16 discussed recently in the dissenting opinion in ARAMCO
17 last term -- which even though disagreed with a particular
18 presumption in that case, acknowledged that where an act
19 would interfere with the conduct of the Nation's foreign
20 relations and diplomacy, the act should not be presumed to
21 apply.
22 And that is directly true here. Because a
23 rigid -- an application of section 7's rigid, substantive
24 standard, and elaborate domestically focused procedural
25 provisions to projects in foreign countries, would
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1 interfere with the flexibility and responsiveness of
2 American foreign policy.
3 After all, foreign aid is -- does not stand in
4 isolation. It's part of a broader diplomatic initiative.
5 And the application of 7(a)(2) would interfere with those
6 initiatives.
7 I'd like to reserve the balance of my time.
8 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Kneedler.
9 Mr. O'Neill, we'll hear from you now.
10 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN B. O'NEILL
11 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
12 MR. O'NEILL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
13 please the Court:
14 I'd like to start with Amy Skilbred and the
15 Mahaweli project. Ms. Skilbred is a Defenders' member,
16 and a professional wildlife biologist who visited Sri
17 Lanka in 1981 and 1982, and visited the Mahaweli project
18 site.
19 She was deposed, and at her deposition she
20 testified that she confmned her visit to the project site
21 by looking at the AID project documents. So Ms. Skilbred
22 went to the site, and she went to the site for the purpose
23 of studying endangered species and their habitat.
24 Concededly, she didn't see any endangered species at the
25 site, but that's why she was there. To require her to
505
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 5
27
1 actually find the endangered species is sort of a catch-
2 22 because if they were easy to find, they wouldn't be
3 endangered.
4 Ms. Skilbred wants to return. And in her
5 deposition she stated that the reason that she could not
6 return, or could not have present plans to return to the
7 Mahaweli project was because there was an ongoing civil
8 war. So to say that she doesn't have an intent to return
9 is to misstate the record. She does intend to return.
10 She couldn't return at the time of her deposition because
11 of the civil war.
12 QUESTION: Did she say anything more specific
13 about her plan to return than that, other than that she
14 planned to -- as I understand it from the Solicitor
15 General, she said she did not have any definite plan to
16 return. Did she say anything more?
17 MR. O'NEILL: She said, specifically, I can't
18 return now because of the civil war. And in answer to the
19 question, and for what purpose would you like to go back
20 to Sri Lanka to visit the Mahaweli project, she answered,
21 I'd rather go back to visit the wildlife that live in the
22 area of the Mahaweli project. She did not have a plane
23 ticket.
24 QUESTION: Well, she not only didn't have a plan
25 ticket, she didn't have any plan, it sounds from that.
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1 MR. O'NEILL: One of the deponents, Steven
2 Schroer had a plane ticket, and had a passport.
3 QUESTION: Well, did the Eighth Circuit grant
4 him -- grant your organization standing on his behalf?
5 MR. O'NEILL: No, sir, they did not.
6 QUESTION: Did you cross-appeal?
7 MR. O'NEILL: No, we did not.
8 QUESTION: Then I don't think he can be involved
9 in this case.
10 MR. O'NEILL: I'd respectfully offer the
11 following proposition: the Eighth Circuit sustained the
12 organization's standing. We won below, and any grounds
13 that can be used to sustain the verdict below, ought to be
14 used by this Court.
15 QUESTION: So you say that you can invoke
16 different persons who may have been deposed, since what
17 we're talking about is organizational standing. And the
18 Eighth Circuit sustained your organization's standing?
19 MR. O'NEILL: That's our position, Your Honor.
20 We can invoke any individual, so long as there was an
21 adequate record before the district court. And Mr.
22 Schroer's deposition, like Ms. Skilbred's deposition, was
23 lodged with the district court.
24 With regard to the Mahaweli project --
25 QUESTION: If you want to speak about Mr. -- the
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1 gentleman you just spoke --
2 MR. O'NEILL: Schroer was to visit a World Bank
3 project, I believe in Thailand, and had a ticket to
4 Thailand, and had a passport at the time of his
5 deposition.
6 QUESTION: Well, but the World Bank isn't a
7 United States agency.
8 MR. O'NEILL: No, but the Treasury Department
9 funds the World Bank. The Treasury -- and the statute,
10 section 7, deals with any agency action that authorized
11 funds or carries out a project.
12 QUESTION: Well, this sounds very much like the
13 house that Jack built.
14 (Laughter.)
15 QUESTION: We're talking about an Interior
16 Department, Interior -- interpretive regulation. And
17 you're telling us that the World Bank was going to fund a
18 project in Thailand. I mean, there just seems to be a
19 great deal of distance between the two.
20 MR. O'NEILL: We disagree that it is an
21 interpretive regulation. And, indeed, when the Interior
22 Department published the regulation, in the preamble to
23 the regulation in the Federal Register, the Interior
24 Department took the position that the regulation was
25 binding on other Federal agencies.
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1 QUESTION: Does it still take that position?
2 MR. O'NEILL: It doesn't before this Court. But
3 there's nothing published in any new preamble, or in any
4 new regulations. But the position that they took in the
5 preamble to the '86 regulation, and it's -- and the
6 proposed rule, was that it was a regulation that was
7 binding on all of the Federal agencies, in response to the
8 specific suggestion by other agencies that the Interior
9 Department ought to make these nonbinding guidelines.
10 QUESTION: How could the Interior Department
11 bind other agencies in this regard? I mean, I think the
12 Interior Department can say, you know, whether it will
13 consult or not. But I don't see how the Interior
14 Department can bind them not to do the funding.
15 MR. O'NEILL: The Interior Department is given
16 authority in both sections 4 and 7 of the regulations to
17 publish rules implementing the statute. And the position
18 that the Interior Department took in the preamble to its
19 1986 regulations and the proposed regulations, was that
20 that's specifically what it was doing. It was
21 implementing the statute, and it was given that authority
22 by the Congress. That's the Department's position.
23 QUESTION: If the Interior Department had not
24 issued these regulations, one of the points made by the
25 Government is there's -- there's nothing to show that the
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1 agencies, themselves, would not have adopted the position
2 taken in the regulation.
3 MR. O'NEILL: That's --
4 QUESTION: In which case they would not
5 consult, in which case you'd have the same result you have
6 here.
7 MR. O'NEILL: That's a correct statement.
8 QUESTION: Well, if that's a correct statement,
9 then you haven't met one of the conditions for standing,
10 is -- which is that the injury you complain about would
11 not occur if the relief you were given is accorded.
12 MR. O'NEILL: What --
13 QUESTION: What you've just said is that whether
14 the -- whether the Secretary has this regulation out or
15 not, it may well be that these agencies won't consult.
16 MR. O'NEILL: Well, let me address that.
17 The first answer to that is that the Secretary's
18 position is that the rules are legally binding. The
19 second answer to that is right now, the Secretary refuses
20 to consult --
21 QUESTION: Excuse me. It doesn't matter what
22 the Secretary's position is. The point is, if the
23 agencies -- have that same position, they are not going to
24 consult. And therefore, just getting the Secretary to
25 change his mind is not going to give you the relief you
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1 want. The agencies may still not consult.
2 MR. O'NEILL: It gives -- we are not required to
3 address every aspect of our injury. By getting the
4 Secretary to change the regulation, we, for the first time
5 in a number of years, make consultation available to the
6 agencies. Right now, the Secretary has published a
7 refusal to consult. The Secretary is, in essence, a
8 scofflaw, and says I'm not going to result -- I'm not
9 going to consult, and has done so formally.
10 So the regulation is a harm, because the
11 consultation service is not available to the other Federal
12 agencies. That's a harm.
13 The second harm is that so long as the
14 consultation service is not available to the other
15 agencies, nobody's going to consult. And nobody now does
16 consult. And species are at risk because the one --
17 QUESTION: But you can attack that when
18 somebody doesn't consult, goes ahead and funds a project.
19 And then you can attack that agency that funds the project.
20 But trying to do that indirectly by attacking
21 the Secretary, when you don't know -- the agency might go
22 ahead and adopt the same interpretation of the law that
23 the Secretary has adopted. It's very likely that the
24 agency would. Even if the -- even if the Secretary
25 withdrew this, it seems to me very likely that the other
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1 agencies of Government -- regardless of his regulation --
2 would continue to adopt the same position. So this Court
3 would have issued an opinion, spun its wheels, for no
4 benefit whatever.
5 MR. O'NEILL: The initial reason that nobody
6 consults today is that the service is not available,
7 because the Secretary, by regulation, refuses to make it
8 available.
9 QUESTION: Well, we don't know that. They may
10 not be consulting simply because they agree with the
11 Secretary -- since they're in the same Government as the
12 Secretary, I bet you they do.
13 So even if he -- even if he withdrew this
14 regulation, you're going to have the same result.
15 MR. O'NEILL: Well, then you have a situation
16 where you have the whole Government refusing to comply
17 with the statute --
18 QUESTION: And you have a means of challenging
19 that. If and when an agency goes ahead and funds a
20 project without consulting, go get them.
21 MR. O'NEILL: I agree that we have that means of
22 challenging the project. In addition, we are challenging
23 the Secretary's position in a way that such agency
24 decisions has been challenged since Abbott Laboratories.
25 And we had the same kind of a situation here that the
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Court had in Abbott Laboratories.
We have a legal construction of a statute. We
have a final regulation, which you didn't have in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation. There's nothing else that
can be brought to the party to help with regard to the
interpretation of the statute. And there is ongoing
harm -- that is, the consultation process, which is the
remedy that the Congress enacted to solve the problem of
extinction, is not in place.
So while we can sue, with regard to a specific
project, we've chosen this route. And this route has been
sanctioned in Abbott Laboratores; this route was
sanctioned months before we filed this civil action in the
Japanese Whaling v. American Cetacean case, which
Defenders and HSUS were plaintiffs in.
QUESTION: But Lab says you can challenge a
rule, but -- in Abbott Labs, by striking down the rule, we
would -- we eliminated the obstacle that the plaintiffs
were complaining about -- namely, they thought that they
could not issue these pharmaceuticals with these labels,
because the Secretary had said if you do, you'll be
prosecuted.
Once we struck that down, that obstacle was
eliminated. What I'm suggesting to you is that we can
strike down this regulation and we don't know that the
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1 obstacle will be eliminated.
2 The other -- crucial to the relief you want is
3 that the agency consult. And if the agencies have the
4 same view of the law that the Secretary does -- and it
5 seems to me quite likely that they do -- you're wasting
6 our time. We can give you everything you ask, and nothing
7 will change.
8 MR. O'NEILL: I hope I'm not wasting your time.
9 There is a chance that the agencies will not
10 consult if this Court affirms the Eighth Circuit. That's
11 a fact.
12 QUESTION: You're presuming that those agencies
13 would disregard a decision of this Court interpreting that
14 statute?
15 MR. O'NEILL: I said there was a chance. I
16 think it's extremely unlikely.
17 QUESTION: I don't think that's a reasonable
18 presumption, is it, that the agencies would refuse to
19 follow our interpretation of the law?
20 MR. O'NEILL: The Justice -- I would assume
21 that, if this Court rules, that's the end of the subject.
22 The Secretary will issue a regulation, the agencies will
23 comply with the regulation, the Secretary will begin to
24 consult, and endangered species will begin to be protected
25 worldwide like the statute requires.
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1 As to whether there is a possibility on the
2 outskirts of reality that the agencies won't comply, the
3 answer to that is there is a possibility. But it is
4 extremely unlikely.
5 I'd like to talk for a minute about the statute.
6 The statute that's at issue is essentially the fourth
7 iteration of the Endangered Species Act. There was an
8 iteration issued in '66, an iteration issued in '69. The
9 iteration in '69 created a listing process. And under the
10 '69 statutes, species throughout the world were listed.
11 So that in 1973, Congress was writing against an
12 Endangered Species Act that listed species throughout the
13 world. The 1973 act, in section 2, the Congress
14 recognizes that the U.S. has pledged itself as a sovereign
15 state in the international community, to conserve various
16 species of wildlife.
17 Section 4, which deals with the listing of the
18 species, requires that both foreign and domestic species
19 are listed. And there's no question about that. And the
20 Secretary lists foreign species.
21 Section 7(a)(2), which is at issue, and which
22 was written against the backdrop of the 1969 Endangered
23 Species Act which listed species worldwide, says each
24 Federal agency -- it doesn't say each Federal agency
25 except the State Department -- shall consult with the
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1 Secretary to ensure that any agency action -- and it
2 doesn't say any agency action in the United States --
3 funded or carried out as not likely to jeopardize the
4 continued existence of any endangered or threatened
5 species. It doesn't say any endangered or threatened
6 species in the United States.
7 But again, that section, in '73 when it was
8 passed, was passed against a backdrop of listing of all
9 species, both here and abroad. When the act was amended
10 in 1978, and that's why I said that there were essentially
11 four versions of the act that we're talking about, the
12 Secretary's position was that section 7 applied worldwide.
13 QUESTION: May I stop you there, for just a
14 moment?
15 MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir.
16 QUESTION: Is the authority for that the
17 guideline that's in pages 28 to 30 of the joint appendix,
18 where they talked about the general parameters, that
19 section 7 applies to activities and programs by Federal
20 agencies affecting listed species in foreign countries and
21 high seas?
22 MR. O'NEILL: The guidelines were published
23 before the 1977 and '78 regulations.
24 QUESTION: But is that the language, basically,
25 you're tking about?
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1 MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir.
2 QUESTION: Because -- I have this question in
3 reading it. It's clear that it applies to endangered
4 species in foreign countries and on the high seas, but it
5 isn't clear to me that that applies to projects located
6 out of the United States. Because you could have projects
7 in the southern part of the State -- of the United States
8 that affect species in Mexico or Canada or something like
9 that. But I'm not -- it isn't clear to me that the
10 project had to be located out of the States.
11 MR. O'NEILL: The '70 -- the regulations that
12 went into effect in January of 1978 made clear that the
13 protection of the act applied to species outside the
14 United States.
15 QUESTION: Right, I can see that. And do they
16 disagree with that? If there were a project on the
17 Canadian border that would cause acid rain or something
18 like that and affect species across the border, wouldn't
19 they agree there would be consultation there?
20 MR. O'NEILL: I believe they would.
21 QUESTION: And why do you -- what is it that you
22 say, in the prior guidelines, made it clear that the --
23 that the project outside the United States was governed?
24 MR. O'NEILL: The regs -- the 1978 regulations
25 did make it clear that they were addressing projects
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1 outside the United States.
2 QUESTION: It did.
3 MR. O'NEILL: And then the conference report,
4 when it changes section 7 in 1978, the conference
5 committee says the conferees felt that the Senate
6 provision, by retaining existing law, was preferable,
7 since regulations governing section 7 are now familiar to
8 most Federal agencies. So the conferees were aware
9 specifically of the section 7 regulations. And the
10 section 7 regulations had been published in January of
11 1978 and had talked about this debate, and said we're
12 going to apply the regulations worldwide.
13 So one can presume that the conferees knew of
14 the debate when they restructured section 7, and said
15 we're not changing the section 7 law. And when they
16 changed section 7, and they provided for judicial review,
17 from the consultation process -- as Justice O'Connor
18 mentioned, they provided for suit in the District of
19 Columbia when you can't sue in any other circuit.
20 And section 7 provides for review by the
21 Secretary of State. It provides for national security
22 review. The Secretary's reading reads out half of the
23 endangered species that are listed.
24 So the Secretary, in making this so-called
25 interpretive regulation, isn't tinkering with the edges of
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1 the statute. He isn't interstitially filling in gaps
2 within the statute. He's taking the language in section
3 7, which is broadly based -- any and all -- and he's
4 cutting out half of the endangered species.
5 With regard to the contention that the citizens'
6 suit provision does not apply, section A of the citizens'
7 suit provision says any person may commence a civil action
8 on his own behalf to enjoin any person, including the U.S.
9 and agencies alleged to be in violation of any provision
10 of this chapter. The Secretary is in violation of the
11 duty to consult because he has publicly affirmed the fact
12 that he refuses to consult.
13 The Secretary is in violation of the duty to
14 publish legal regulations. And in the court below, we
15 alleged that the Secretary had an affirmative duty to
16 ensure that programs can serve endangered species. His
17 regulation does not meet the obligations of that
18 affirmative duty.
19 QUESTION: (Inaudible) do you think just any
20 person in the -- any citizen in the country could bring
21 this suit?
22 MR. O'NEILL: Yes.
23 QUESTION: Everyone's got standing?
24 MR. O'NEILL: Well, that is not our case. But
25 the statute creates a heritage --
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1 QUESTION: Well, I don't know why. If it was so
2 clear, I suppose it would be your case. You wouldn't have
3 to be talking around about going to India or someplace.
4 MR. O'NEILL: Well, we had a member who went
5 to Mahaweli at Sri Lanka, and it was -- why push the edges
6 of the standing envelope?
7 QUESTION: Well, you're now doing it.
8 MR. O'NEILL: I'll move on.
9 (Laughter.)
10 MR. O'NEILL: Moving right along --
11 QUESTION: Mr. O'Neill, instead of moving on,
12 could you move back just for a second --
13 MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir.
14 QUESTION: -- to your point about the fact that
15 the Secretary's reading of 7 renders irrelevant the
16 listing of foreign species? Isn't an answer to that that
17 although the Secretary's reading would, of course,
18 not -- of section 7 would, of course, render the listing
19 of foreign species irrelevant to 7, the listing would
20 still be relevant under section 8, with the -- which
21 provides the obligation of foreign consultation? Isn't
22 that a way of reconciling the listing of foreign species
23 with the Secretary's reading of 7?
24 MR. O'NEILL: Section 8 provides for assistance
25 programs to foreign nations. So the listing doesn't come
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1 into play with regard to section 8.
2 QUESTION: Oh, the listing has no reference to
3 8?
4 MR. O'NEILL: No, but it does to 9. So your
5 argument works with regard to section 9.
6 QUESTION: I see.
7 MR. O'NEILL: Section 9 provides a series of
8 prohibitions about taking species outside the U.S., about
9 engaging in international trade outside the U.S.
10 My answer to the argument, though, is section 9
11 shows you that when Congress wanted to limit the scope of
12 the statute to the United States or to the high seas, or
13 to the United States, the high seas, and a foreign
14 country, it did so in the structure of section 9.
15 In section 7, they use all-encompassing
16 language -- any agency action, any endangered species. So
17 the lesson that I draw from section 9 is different than
18 the one that you proposed.
19 With regard to the Foley, ARAMCO line of cases,
20 it's our position that they don't apply. We're dealing
21 with our money, in Washington, D.C., right down the
22 street, and our agencies. And the agencies are born of
23 Congress. So it really isn't a question of an extra-
24 territorial application of the statute.
25 QUESTION: But isn't that -- overlook the
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
43
1 language "ensure that any action authorized is not likely
2 to," doesn't that impose an obligation on -- of some kind
3 of best efforts, at least, to be sure what happens in the
4 foreign country?
5 MR. O'NEILL: If we're going to spend our money,
6 it does.
7 QUESTION: Yeah. So then doesn't that -- isn't
8 that a response to your most recent argument?
9 MR. O'NEILL: It is a response, but if you look
10 at the totality of the action decision being made, it is
11 more of a United States action decision than it is a Sri
12 Lankan action decision.
13 QUESTION: What if we're only putting up 10
14 percent of the money?
15 MR. O'NEILL: The consultation process -- and
16 the Congress has found that the interaction that results
17 in the consultation process saves species. If we're
18 putting up 10 percent of the money, our interaction with
19 the Sri Lankan Government may very well affect those
20 species. And there is support in the record for that
21 contention, in a couple of places.
22 A couple of the deponents, including Dr. Elliott
23 McClure, who was an expert in the area, testified that he
24 had seen the consultation process work.
25 The AID documents, below in the record, indicate
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1 the Mahaweli project could harm endangered species, and
2 that the Sri Lankan Government wants our input to avoid
3 that harm. So the consultation process, at least with
4 regard to the Mahaweli project, is made for the situation.
5 The other differences between this case and the
6 Foley, ARAMCO line of cases are that this act explicitly
7 was intended to implement treaties.
8 If you assume that the Foley, ARAMCO line of
9 cases did come into play to begin with, those cases deal
10 with labor and employment. And you can say, well, those
11 are labor and employment cases, but labor and employment
12 is historically a local concern. The environment is not a
13 local concern. And the Congress recognizes it both in the
14 preamble to this statute, and the preamble to numerous
15 other environmental statutes.
16 And in this case, unlike the Foley, ARAMCO line
17 of cases, we believe the statute is clear on its face.
18 The mere fact that the Government makes the argument that
19 it isn't, doesn't change the clarity of the statute.
20 With regard to the general issue of standing, we
21 have a citizens' suit provision. So this case is
22 different than the Federation v. Lujan case. We have a
23 final agency action, which everybody admits that is a
24 final agency action. So this case, unlike the Federation-
25 Lujan case, is -- presents the issue clearly and squarely.
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1 Yes, sir.
2 QUESTION: Come back to what I was asking you,
3 your response to the fact that the Secretary's decision
4 won't make any difference is, well, of course, once we
5 decide that it's unlawful, the other agencies will fall in
6 line.
7 How is that any different from a case in which I
8 try to challenge a law of Indiana as being
9 unconstitutional? And, in fact, I don't live in Indiana;
10 I'm not a citizen of Indiana. This law doesn't apply to
11 me.
12 But there is a similar law in New York that is
13 applying to me. Now, would I have standing to challenge
14 the Indiana law because once the Court says that that law
15 is unconstitutional, of course New York will comply with
16 the Court's decree.
17 Would I really have standing in Indiana --
18 MR. O'NEILL: The answer to your question is --
1.9 QUESTION: -- simply because the judgment will
20 pronounce a determination of law that will be obeyed by
21 somebody else?
22 MR. O'NEILL: The answer to your question is no,
23 you would not have standing.
24 QUESTION: Well, why is this any different?
25 MR. O'NELL: Thank you. For a couple of
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1 reasons. The first is, the Secretary takes the position
2 that the regulation is legally binding, and the Secretary
3 has the support for that position in the statute. The
4 statute delegates to the Secretary a rule-making authority
5 with regard to the Endangered Species Act both in sections
6 4 and 7 of the Endangered Species Act. That's the first
7 reason.
8 The second reason is --
9 QUESTION: So you'd say that the other agencies
10 are bound to follow the Secretary's determination?
11 MR. O'NEILL: That's correct. And that's the
12 Secretary's position, at least in the preamble to the
13 regulations. It isn't today, because it isn't convenient
14 today.
15 QUESTION: Of course, the Secretary could
16 comply, I suppose, by simply withdrawing the regulation
17 and not saying anything.
18 MR. O'NEILL: That is correct. But the form of
19 the -- because the Secretary has abdicated his
20 responsibility for a number of years and has told the
21 world don't consult, and the consultation process has
22 essentially laid waste for a number of years, it is within
23 the sound discretion of the district court judge to tailor
24 a remedy for that wrong. And he has done that.
25 And the nature of the remedy, the district court
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1 remedy, which is publish new rules, is not before this
2 Court. Nobody has argued about it.
3 In addition, what is -- right now, what is the
4 impediment to there being any consultation? The first
5 roadblock that needs to be removed is the Secretary's
6 refusal to consult. If we were to go to an action agency
7 and sue them and say you didn't consult with regard to the
8 Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka, they would say we can't
9 consult because the Secretary refuses to consult.
10 So this is roadblock number one. And roadblock
11 number one is a final, agency action. The Secretary has
12 taken the position that it's a mandatory regulation. And
13 the Secretary has created an additional harm by going out
14 and distributing the line to the other Federal agencies
15 that consultation isn't required. The consultation
16 process has lied fallow. And species continue to be
17 extinguished, as the result of the U.S. projects overseas.
18 That's why I think it's different than New York and -- was
19 it Indiana or Illinois?
20 QUESTION: I think you're right, that those are
21 substantial differences.
22 MR. O'NEILL: I'm going to see if there are any
23 more in my outline.
24 (Laughter.)
25 MR. O'NEILL: If those are the ones I remember,
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1 they've got to be the best ones.
2 And Larson v. Valente says we don't need to cure
3 every single injury.
4 With regard to the standing fight, in addition
5 to the fact that there's a citizens' suit, if you look at
6 it from a common sense perspective, what else would
7 another procedural posture bring to this case and the
8 resolution of this issue? Nothing. There's the
9 regulation and the statute. And in this case, the
10 regulation is either in violation of the statute, or it
11 isn't in violation of the statute.
12 QUESTION: Well, you can say that about a lot of
13 cases, Mr. O'Neill, in which we've said there was no
14 standing. It's a perfectly good record. A plaintiff with
15 standing might not bring much more to the case, and
16 nonetheless, we've fairly rigorously enforced our standing
17 requirement.
18 MR. O'NEILL: And in this case, I believe we
19 meet them, because Ms. Skilbred who went to he site, who
20 intends to go back to the site.
21 The argument -- and I say this facetiously --
22 but the argument that the Government makes about what kind
23 of intention you need to go back to the site, in essence
24 requires us to camp out at the site, in order to have
25 standing.
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1 QUESTION: Whereas you say a visit 10 years ago
2 suffices.
3 MR. O'NEILL: Well, it wasn't a visit 10 years
4 ago when we started the civil action. The civil action is
5 5 years old -- 5 years. She uses the resource,
6 professionally, and she intended to go back.
7 But we have different kinds of use. Dr. Elliott
8 McClure, for example, studied Asian elephants. Now, he's
9 never been to the Mahaweli project, but the Mahaweli
10 project is extinguishing Asian elephants from the face of
11 the earth. There's an animal nexus between Dr. McClure
12 and the elephant.
13 QUESTION: You mean the Asian elephants might
14 come over here so he could study them here?
15 MR. O'NEILL: He's studied them in places other
16 than the Mahaweli area of Sri Lanka.
17 QUESTION: You are pressing the outer envelope
18 of standing.
19 (Laughter.)
20 MR. O'NEILL: Then I'll go back to Ms. Skilbred,
21 who, by the way is here, and who, in the last 2 days
22 getting ready for this, I've deeply fallen in love with
23 because she went to the Mahaweli project.
24 But they would require us to camp out at the
25 site. And in all honesty, we don't believe this Court's
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1 decision require us to camp out at the site.
2 If anybody has any further questions I'd be
3 happy to answer them. Otherwise, I'll sit down early.
4 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. O'Neill.
5 MR. O'NEILL: Thank you, Judge.
6 QUESTION: Mr. Kneedler, you have 3 minutes
7 remaining.
8 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
9 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10 MR. KNEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
11 I have several points. First on the question of
12 standing, the Secretary of the Interior did not take the
13 position in 1986, just as we do not take the position
14 today, that the interpretive regulation is binding on
15 other agencies. I refer the Court to page 6 of our brief,
16 in which we say that the preamble to the 1986 regulation
17 stated that the Fish and Wildlife Service performs only,
18 quote, "an advisory function under section 7," close
19 quote, and that the action agency makes the ultimate
20 decision as to whether its proposed actions will comply
21 with the act.
22 QUESTION: Yeah, but that doesn't -- it doesn't
23 reach the question of whether there's -- they're bound to
24 consult.
25 MR. KNEEDLER: Well, but the -- this is an
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1 interpretive regulation. The Secretary of the Interior,
2 and respondents' own witnesses in this case, as we showed
3 in our brief, agreed with us. The Secretary cannot make
4 another agency consult.
5 QUESTION: Your colleague on the other side said
6 that at one time, the Secretary took the position that the
7 agency is bound to consult, if he has a regulation that
8 they have to consult.
9 You haven't answered that yet.
10 MR. KNEEDLER: No, the best evidence that they
11 did not is the fact that respondents have not pointed to,
12 and we are not aware of a single instance in which
13 an -- in which an agency --
14 QUESTION: So you did say that -- you did say
15 the Secretary has never taken that position.
16 MR. KNEEDLER: Has never taken the position --
17 QUESTION: Well, that's with respect to foreign
18 projects. But there is an obligation to consult with
19 regard to --
20 MR. KNEEDLER: There's an obligation to consult.
21 And again, what --
22 QUESTION: But isn't that equal -- I mean, it
23 just depends on the scope of the obligation. Why is one
24 any more mandatory than the other? It's a question of
25 whether --
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1 MR. KNEEDLER: The statutory duty is mandatory.
2 The question is whether the Secretary's interpretation of
3 what the statute means --
4 QUESTION: But if the statute clearly applied to
5 foreign projects, then there would be a mandatory duty to
6 consult.
7 MR. KNEEDLER: Right, but that's not -- that's
8 different from saying the Secretary's interpretive
9 regulation is binding on the agency. Whatever binds the
10 agency is the statute, itself, not what the Secretary says
11 about it.
12 QUESTION: But would the -- would this
13 Secretary's interpretation of the statute be entitled to
14 deference from other agencies?
15 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes, it would be entitled to
16 deference the same way as any others. But from 1978 to
17 1986, while the prior regulation was in effect, agencies
18 did not consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service.
19 QUESTION: Do you agree with his reading that
20 that regulation clearly applied to foreign projects, as
21 well as species in foreign countries?
22 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.
23 QUESTION: You do.
24 MR. KNEEDLER: 1978.
25 With respect to the fact that this Court might
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1 affirm the judgment, the standing question, with all
2 respect, has to be looked at at the time the plaintiffs
3 filed the action in district court. The question is
4 whether a single, district court decision construing the
5 act would be followed by other agencies. And there's no
6 indication -- no reason to believe that it would be.
7 On the merits, with respect to the listing
8 requirement, Justice Souter, section 8 does specifically
9 refer to endangered or threatened species with respect to
10 the President's furnishing of foreign assistance. So the
11 listing of foreign species is tied in both with respect to
12 section 8 and section 9.
13 Finally, with respect to the presumption,
14 respondents say it only applies for local activities such
15 as employment. But we say that there is -- in our view,
16 nothing could be more local than the construction of a
17 project on foreign soil by a foreign government in matters
18 that affect that foreign country's own resources. There's
19 no reason to believe that section 7 applies there.
20 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.
21 Kneedler.
22 The case is submitted.
23 (Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the
24 above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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